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The thesis is a collection of three essays on retail competition that are relevant to both 
the theory and practice of marketing.  Essay 1, examines the role of price and category 
assortment on competition between EDLP (Every Day Low Price) format and HILO 
(Promotion) format retail stores. Policy experiments are conducted to study the 
strategic implications of 1) retail assortment reduction and 2) customized (household 
specific) coupons. The empirical analysis is conducted using a) household and store 
level  scanner data and b) combination of hierarchical Bayes and classical estimation 
techniques.  
 
Essay 2, models the price and geographic location elements of consumer demand, firm 
costs and competition in the lodging industry. A new demand model (Heterogeneous 
Aggregate Generalized Nested Logit) is introduced. The essay demonstrates the role 
of geographic location as an important element of retailers’ marketing mix.  Essay 3, 
proposes an empirical framework for long-run discrete dynamic games to study 
market firm’s entry, stay, and exit decisions in the lodging market. The econometric 
model is based on Markov perfect equilibrium concept and relies on dynamic 
programming computational techniques. Essays 2 and 3 use aggregate data and 
classical estimation techniques to recover the underlying structural parameters.   
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ESSAY 1 
PRICE-ASSORTMENT LINKS IN CONSUMER AND COMPETITIVE CHOICES 
– A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF RETAIL COMPETITION1  
 
Abstract 
In retailing, consumers may find their needs satisfied by either a single retailer or 
divide their patronage among multiple retailers who, in combination, satisfy their 
needs. This is particularly true in U.S. grocery retailing, where an overwhelming 
majority of consumers shop in more than one store (Progressive Grocer, 1997). The 
outcome of this is that retail stores compete for customers. Retail competition affects 
category pricing, assortment, promotion, store location and other decisions made by 
retailers. These decisions are based on retailers’ perceptions of consumer demand, i.e. 
how consumers choose between retail stores, decide to purchase in categories in these 
stores, and choose brands/SKUs in these categories. Previous consumer demand 
focused studies that have modeled these three consumer choice decisions have done 
so ignoring the supply side interactions between competing retailers and/or have not 
modeled the three consumer choice decisions via a single utility maximization 
framework. 
                                                 
1 The author acknowledges Professors Ram Rao, Young-Hoon Park, Ambar Rao, Chakravarti 
Narasimhan, and Eric Eisenstein for their insightful comments and Marketing Seminar attendees at 
Cornell University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Emory University, University 
of Maryland, University of Texas at Dallas, University of Texas at Austin, Indiana University, 
University of British Columbia, Washington University at St. Louis and University of Pittsburgh for 
their comments and pointers. The author thanks David R. Bell for providing the IRI shopping basket 
data.  The usual disclaimers apply.  
 
1 
 
 
 2
On the supply side, theoretical literature on retail pricing recognizes (1) 
manufacturers' actions (e.g., wholesale prices, promotional payments) and (2) retail 
competition, as important drivers of retailer category pricing decisions. However, 
empirical studies have mainly studied manufacturer-level or multi-manufacturer-
single-retailer competition. Effects of retail competition on retailer category pricing 
decisions have not received as much attention. The few studies that have either 
directly or indirectly accounted for the effect of retail competition on retailer category 
pricing decisions have not simultaneously modeled the three consumer decisions of 
store choice, category incidence and SKU choice. This limits one’s understanding of 
the effects of retailers’ decisions on the three consumer choice decisions. For example 
-- Does lowering prices increase store traffic or/and does it affect category incidence 
and SKU choice decisions? Are these effects similar across HILO and EDLP stores?   
Retailer category pricing decisions are based on retailers’ perceptions of competitive 
responses to their own decisions.  In turn, consumer choices are affected by these 
retail decisions. Therefore, to understand retail category pricing decisions, it is 
important to develop a joint framework of consumer choices across stores and 
brands/SKUs, and retailers’ competitive decisions of prices, assortment, etc. that 
impact consumer choices.  In this paper we build such a model of consumer choice 
and retail competition and their effect on retailer category pricing decisions.   
 
By building on previous studies, we add to the current literature in important ways. 
We propose a unified utility structure that nests the three decisions of store choice, 
category purchase incidence and SKU choice. Our approach, therefore, allows for 
interdependencies in the three consumer choice decisions that have not been 
accommodated in previous studies. Unlike previous structural studies that have 
indirectly accounted for retail competition using aggregate data, we use actual 
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marketing mix variables in competing stores to directly account for retail competition 
and estimate our proposed demand model using household level scanner panel data. 
By exploiting the panel structure of the data and accounting for consumer 
heterogeneity, we present a clearer understanding of household choices than studies 
using only aggregate data.   
 
In addition to the usually studied marketing-mix variables of price, feature and 
display, we also study the role of retail category assortments -- assortment breadth 
(number of SKUs in category) and assortment depth (number of SKUs of each brand) 
-- in the consumer choice process. We also control for potential endogeneity in price 
and assortment. Rather than relying on classical estimation techniques, we estimate 
our model using the hierarchical Bayes procedure, which helps us recover household 
level parameters. A novel feature of this approach is that it allows retailers to identify 
households that might be more sensitive than others to retailers’ category level 
decisions. On the supply side, we study category level retail competition by specifying 
a Bertrand-Nash pricing game between competing retailers. We estimate the resulting 
equilibrium pricing equations to obtain weekly retailer markups at the store-SKU 
level.   
 
The proposed equilibrium model and the recovered demand and supply side estimates 
are used to address important questions about retail competition such as: a) What 
tradeoffs do consumers make in price and assortments? Are consumers willing to pay 
more for larger assortment depth or assortment breadth?  b) How does assortment 
reduction affect retailer profits? Does assortment reduction affect retailers equally? c) 
What are the implications for retailer profits when retailers issue targeted coupons? 
Are these effects different for EDLP and HILO stores?  
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The model and estimates provide insights into the existence and magnitude of retail 
competition in price, and the effect of assortment depth and breadth on this 
competition. The proposed equilibrium model, i.e., the unified utility structure 
coupled with the supply model, provides a general framework to study a hierarchical 
consumer choice process and its implications for competition. 
 
1. Introduction 
In retailing, consumers may find their needs satisfied by either a single retailer or 
divide their patronage among multiple retailers who, in combination, satisfy their 
needs. This is more pronounced in U.S. grocery retailing, where research consistently 
shows that an overwhelming majority of consumers shop in more than one store 
(Progressive Grocer, 1997). The outcome of this is that retail stores compete for 
customers. Specifically, in the context of grocery retail, competition affects pricing, 
assortment, promotion, location and other decisions made by retailers. These decisions 
are based on retailers’ perceptions of how consumers choose between retail stores, 
decide to purchase in categories in these stores, and choose brands/SKUs in these 
categories.  Previous studies that have modeled these three consumer choice decisions 
have done so ignoring the supply side interactions between competing retailers and/or 
have not modeled the three consumer choice decisions via a single utility 
maximization framework. 
On the supply side, the theoretical literature on retail category pricing recognizes (1) 
manufacturers' actions (e.g., wholesale prices, promotional payments) and (2) retail 
competition, as important drivers of retailer decisions (Lal and Villas-Boas, 1998; 
Pesendorfer, 2001).  On the empirical side, some studies have explored other factors 
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such as multi-category dependencies in retailer actions (Song and Chintagunta, 2003) 
and dynamics in retailer decisions within a category (Chen and Seetharaman, 2002). 
However, most empirical studies have assumed that retailers set prices for different 
brands/SKUs in a product category to maximize single period category profits (Raju, 
Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995; Tellis and Zufryden 1995; Chintagunta, 2002). In light of 
the emerging trend towards category management by retailers, this single category 
pricing decision/assumption might not be very restrictive (Zenor 1994). Among the 
empirical studies that have examined category pricing decisions, Chintagunta (2002) 
and Sudhir (2001) also examine departures from the standard category profit 
maximization assumption by a strategic retailer2. These departures might be a result of 
a retailer’s favorability towards a certain brand or desire to increase the share of its 
private label.  
Prior research suggests that in U.S. grocery retailing, retailers may react to activities at 
competing chains. The empirical evidence that relates prices and promotions in certain 
categories to store traffic is, however, mixed. Dhar and Hoch (1997) and Dreze (1995) 
suggest that retailers lower the prices of national brands to attract shoppers into the 
store. While Dreze (1995) finds that lower prices in the cola category attract more 
shoppers into the store, Walters (1991) and Walters and MacKenzie (1988) find that 
to be the case with some -- but not all -- brands within two focal categories.  
                                                 
2 Store brand plays an important strategic role for the retailer (Dhar and Hoch,1997; Narasimhan and 
Wilcox,1998; and  Scott--Morton and Zettelmeyer,2000). A retailer’s favorability towards its private 
label can be motivated in part by the umbrella branding ability of the private label, and its resulting 
ability to build store loyalty.  Retailers might receive special manufacturer deals or delegate the pricing 
decision to a channel captain. These effects might cause a retailer to deviate from its primary objective 
of maximizing category profits.   
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Despite theoretical findings that retail competition affects retailers’ category pricing 
decisions, most structural empirical studies on retail category pricing have studied 
manufacturer-level or multi-manufacturer-single-retailer competition. Effects of retail 
competition on retailer category pricing decisions have not received as much 
attention. Furthermore, the few studies that have accounted for effects of retail 
competition on retailer category pricing decisions, have not simultaneously modeled 
the three consumer decisions (ex. Chintagunta, 2002).  
 
Hence retail decisions can be based on retailers’ perceptions of competitive responses 
to their own decisions.  In turn, consumer choices are affected by these retail 
decisions. Therefore, to understand retail competition, it is important to develop a 
joint framework of consumer choices across stores and brands/SKUs, and retailers’ 
decisions of prices, assortment, etc. that impact consumer choices.  In this paper we 
build such a model of consumer choice and retail competition.   
 
By building on previous studies, we add to the current literature in important ways.  
We propose a unified utility structure that nests the three decisions of store choice, 
category purchase incidence and SKU choice. Using household level transaction data, 
comprised of shopping trips made by households across multiple stores belonging to 
different chains, we estimate a nested logit demand model.  Our specification, 
therefore, provides a framework in which the three consumer decisions are outcomes 
of the maximization of a single utility function. Therefore our approach allows for 
interdependencies in the three consumer choice decisions that have not been 
accommodated in previous studies. Unlike previous structural studies that have 
indirectly accounted for retail competition using aggregate data, we use the more 
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preferred approach of using actual marketing mix variables in competing stores to 
directly account for retail competition and estimate our proposed demand model using 
household level scanner panel data. By exploiting the panel structure of the data and 
accounting for consumer heterogeneity, we present a clearer understanding of 
household choices than studies using only aggregate data.   
 
In addition to the usually studied marketing-mix variables of price, feature and 
display, we also study the role of retail category assortments -- assortment breadth 
(number of SKUs in category) and assortment depth (number of SKUs of each brand) 
-- in the consumer choice process. We also control for potential endogeneity in price 
and assortment. Rather than relying on classical estimation techniques, we estimate 
our model using the hierarchical Bayes procedure, which helps us recover household 
level parameters. A novel feature of this approach is that it allows retailers to identify 
households that might be more sensitive than others to retailers’ category level 
decisions. On the supply side, we study category level retail competition by specifying 
a Bertrand-Nash pricing game between competing retailers. We estimate the resulting 
equilibrium pricing equations to obtain weekly retailer markups at the store-SKU 
level.   
To summarize, we account for both demand side and supply side factors 
(manufacturer prices and retail competition) that affect retailer category pricing via a 
structural equilibrium model. Thus, we build on the previous empirical literature on 
retailer pricing behavior and -- like Sudhir (2001) and Draganska and Jain (2002) -- 
focus on prices the retailer should charge conditional on the estimated demand and 
supply parameters.  
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The proposed equilibrium model and the recovered demand and supply side estimates 
are used to address important questions about retail competition such as:  
 
1. How are retailers’ profits affected by product line reduction by an upstream 
manufacturer?  How are retailers' profits affected by assortment reduction by a 
retail account?  Our equilibrium analysis considers the effects of reduced 
assortment on costs, sales, and margins of all competing retail stores.  
 
2. What are the equilibrium implications of a targeted couponing strategy by 
retailers? Coupons enable firms to price discriminate between price-elastic and 
price-inelastic consumers (Narasimhan, 1984), thereby increasing firm profits. 
For example, Rossi and Allenby (1996) demonstrate that manufacturer profits 
from targeted coupons are as much as 2.5 times the profits from blanket 
coupon programs. Another view in the literature is that coupons reduce 
consumers’ switching costs, thereby increasing price competition (Shaffer and 
Zhang, 1995; Bester and Petrakis, 1996) and reducing equilibrium profits.  
However, these papers have considered only the perspective of manufacturers.  
Our analysis provides empirical insights into the question of gains from 
targeted couponing by retailers.  
 
Besanko, Dube’ and Gupta (2003) consider the profitability implications of 
targeted couponing in a market consisting of competing manufacturers who 
sell through a common retailer.  However, this study ignores retail 
competition. In contrast, the current study assesses whether the market demand 
coupled with competitive retail conditions makes targeted price discrimination 
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profitable for retailers. Specifically, does targeted couponing benefit all 
retailers or does it benefit some -- but not all -- retailers?  
 
The model and estimates provide insights into the existence and magnitude of retail 
competition in price, and the effect of assortment depth and breadth on this 
competition.   The proposed model -- i.e. the unified utility structure coupled with the 
supply model -- provides a general framework to study a hierarchical consumer choice 
process and its implications for competition. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we discuss three relevant streams of literature and how they relate to 
our analysis of retail competition.  
 
2.1 Consumer choice modeling
There is a rich tradition of modeling consumer choice in marketing.   Several papers 
in this area have examined how consumer decisions of store choice, category purchase 
incidence, and brand choice are influenced by retailer decisions.  As our interest is in 
studying retail competition, we review papers that model store choice, the backbone 
of retail competition.  
  
Bucklin and Lattin (1992) model consumer store choice, category purchase incidence, 
and brand choice decisions for laundry detergents. They do not find a significant 
effect of retail feature advertising on store substitution. However they do find that 
features affect category purchase incidence in a significant way. The category effect 
stems from consumers stockpiling when prices are low, which affects consumers’ 
category purchase incidence probability in that store and other stores in the future. An 
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important aspect of the model is that change in category purchase incidence does not 
alter the store choice probability because the store choice decision is modeled as being 
independent of the brand choice and category purchase decisions. The Bucklin and 
Lattin (1992) study accounts for observed consumer heterogeneity but not unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity. This may have caused bias in the estimated effects of 
marketing mix variables.  
  
It appears likely that the assumption of independence of consumer decisions and 
unaccounted for consumer heterogeneity might have led to the finding that retailers’ 
category marketing activity has no direct effect on consumer store choice. By this we 
mean that there might be a segment of consumers in the market whose store choice 
decisions are significantly influenced by retailers’ category level marketing mix 
decisions, even though at the aggregate level these effects appear to be insignificant. 
This segment of store switchers can affect retailers’ pricing decisions, especially if 
these consumers are also large basket shoppers.  Hence we propose a unified 
econometric demand model that takes into account unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity to better control for the presence of retail competition.  
  
Bell et al. (1998) and Bell and Lattin (1998) find that expected retail price of the 
shopping basket affects consumer store choice decisions. Hence retailers’ pricing 
decisions across product categories affect consumer demand and retail competition.   
 
While the Bucklin and Lattin (1992) single category analysis finds no evidence in 
support of retail competition, the Bell et al. (1998) and Bell and Lattin (1998) studies 
find empirical support for retail competition at the shopping basket level.  The aim of 
the current study is to assess how retailer activity in a single category affects 
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consumer store switching and retail competition. While previous studies have focused 
on the effects of marketing mix variables like price, feature advertising, 
merchandising etc., another variable in the retailers’ marketing mix that affects store 
choice decisions is stores’ assortment.  We address the gap in the choice modeling 
literature by including this decision variable in the proposed consumer demand model.  
 
2.2 Supply side modeling 
Apart from the literature on choice models, there is also a complementary literature 
that focuses on competition, or supply side.  We consider the following two studies in 
this genre.  In a study of disposable diapers, Kumar and Leone (1988) use a 
hierarchical modeling approach to study pair-wise brand substitution effects both 
within and across stores. They find significant effects of price and features on store 
substitution. Walters’ (1991) analysis of the cake mix and spaghetti sauce categories 
also finds evidence that single brand pricing activity in one store affects sales in 
competing stores. Since neither of these studies models consumer demand from a 
utility maximization perspective -- only aggregate sales -- their modeling framework 
is not suited to our goal of understanding the primitives of consumer choice of SKUs 
and stores, and therefore of retail competition. 
 
2.3 Structural studies of competition 
Building on both the choice literature and the supply side modeling literature, a third 
stream examines structural studies of competition.  That is, they model consumer 
demand from utility maximization and competitive choices from profit maximization 
on the supply side (Kadiyali et al., 2001). Among the studies in this stream, literature 
on category management in grocery retail has explored competition between 
manufacturers, or between manufacturers and a common retailer (Besanko et. al. 
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1998, Sudhir 2001; Draganska and Jain 2001; Chintagunta 2002; Besanko et al. 
2003).  Issues of retail competition, however, have not received as much attention. 
The typical assumption in this literature is that the retailer engages in monopoly 
pricing.  We address this gap in the literature by modeling competition among 
retailers.  
  
To the best of our knowledge, BertoVillas-Boas (2002) is the only study to have 
directly modeled retail competition in the grocery industry based on an equilibrium 
structural demand-and-supply framework. BertoVillas-Boas (2002) studies vertical 
contracting in a channel setting using store level data. The use of aggregate data limits 
her from modeling the consumer store choice and category purchase incidence 
decisions. In a study of retailer category pricing strategies, Chintagunta (2002) uses a 
store traffic measure as a proxy for retail competition. Since he also uses aggregate 
data, the study faces the same limitations as Berto Villas-Boas (2002).  
 
In contrast, our current study uses household level data, which enables us to model 
households’ store choice, category incidence and SKU choice decisions. This allows 
us to gain additional insight into how retailer decisions affect various aspects of 
consumer behavior. Since our data contains competitors’ marketing mix information, 
we do not rely on proxy measures of competition as in Chintagunta (2002).  These 
features of our model provide a more comprehensive understanding than previous 
studies of how consumer demand and retail competition affect retailer category 
pricing. 
 
Like the literature on choice models, the structural modeling literature has not studied 
the role of retail assortments on consumer choice, retailer costs or retailer category 
  
 13
pricing. We address the gap in the structural modeling literature by including this 
variable in the proposed consumer demand model and the retailer cost specification. 
In addition, while accounting for retail competition we study how retailer assortments 
affect category-pricing decisions of competing grocery retailers. 
 
2.4 Retail Assortments   
Marketing management has stressed the importance of retailer product assortment in 
achieving differentiation and satisfying the wants of target shoppers better than the 
competition (e.g., Kahn, 1999; Kahn and McAlister, 1997). Levy and Weitz (1995) 
define assortment as "the number of different items in a merchandise category." While 
much of the empirical literature in marketing has focused on price and other 
marketing mix variables, retail assortment has received very limited attention. Like 
price, assortment has been found to be an important determinant of store profitability 
(Kahn and Schmittlein 1989, 1992).   
 
1. Impact of Assortment on Consumer Demand (and hence Retail Revenues) 
Consumers’ store choice decisions are influenced by assortments offered (Kahn 
and Lehmann, 1991, Arnold et al. 1983). This is because the larger the selection, 
the more likely consumers are to find a product that matches their exact 
specifications (Baumol and Ide, 1956; Lattin and McAlister, 1985). A large 
assortment is particularly valuable for variety seeking consumers or consumers 
with uncertain preferences (Kahn and Lehmann 1991; Kahn 1995; McAlister and 
Pessemier 1982).  
 
Simonson (1999) shows that retail assortments can not only satisfy customers' 
wants, but also influence what they want. This suggests that a retailer’s assortment 
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decisions can change not only the likelihood that a consumer will make a purchase 
(category purchase incidence), but also affect the choice probability of a specific 
option (SKU choice).   
 
2. Impact of Assortment on Retailer Costs 
Assortment decisions also affect retailer costs. Questions such as how much space 
should be allocated to a category/brand/SKU within a category have been the main 
focus of the early work on cost implications of retail assortment (Corstjens and 
Doyle, 1981; Urban 1998). Retailers might also incur additional costs as a result of 
large assortments in the form of stock-outs and overstocking (van Ryzin and 
Mahajan, 1999), or as a result of maintaining consistent assortments (Krishnan et 
al. 2002).  
 
3. Impact of Assortment on Competition 
Focusing on the competitive drivers of assortment choice, Stassen et al. (1999) 
consider the retailer’s assortment decision when consumers switch stores. A 
question that is very important to a retailer in this situation is whether he should 
differentiate from or mimic his competitor’s assortment choice. Here category 
assortments can be thought of as another element of the retailer’s marketing mix in 
attracting consumers into its store. Stassen’s empirical results show that retailers 
mimic each other’s assortments.  
While results of these studies show sales increases with assortment size, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that retailers like Aldi and Save-a-Lot have managed to thrive by 
positioning themselves as low-service, low-cost, low-assortment players.  These 
retailers serve a niche market of consumers who find a tradeoff of lower assortment 
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for lower prices worthwhile. Thus store-level assortment (number of SKUs in 
category) and brand-level assortment (number of SKUs belonging to the same brand) 
may affect consumer shopping behavior, thereby affecting retailers’ pricing and 
positioning strategy.  
The McIntyre and Miller (1999) study considers both the demand side (consumer item 
choice) and the supply side (retailer item pricing and assortment composition 
decisions), while accounting for item complementarities and substitution for a 
category profit maximizing monopolist retailer. Unlike the McIntyre and Miller 
(1999) study, the focus of the current study is not the joint decisions of assortment 
selection and pricing. Instead we treat assortment decision (size of assortment, in our 
case) to be an exogenous decision, i.e. choice of assortment size is not being 
determined on a week-by-week basis. We focus on how retail category pricing is 
affected by a) the tradeoffs that consumers make in price and retail assortments while 
making SKU choice, category purchase incidence and store choice decisions, b) cost 
implications of retailer assortment, and c) regional competition. By simultaneously 
modeling the consumer, cost and competitive effects of retail assortments, our 
structural model serves as a useful tool for store managers to assess how assortment 
decisions affect equilibrium profits.  
To summarize, we propose a unified/single utility structure for the three consumer 
decisions of store choice, category purchase incidence and SKU choice. In addition to 
the usually studied marketing mix variables, we also study how retail assortment 
affects the consumer choice process using two measures: a) assortment breadth 
(number of SKUs in category) and b) assortment depth (number of SKUs of a brand). 
We account for consumer heterogeneity and correct for price and assortment 
endogeneity. On the supply side, we estimate optimal pricing rules for retailers, taking 
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into account consumer demand and assortment varying costs. The calibrated demand 
and supply models are used to simulate changes in equilibrium retail profits resulting 
from assortment reductions and targeted coupon programs.  
3.  Model 
Using household level transaction data across multiple stores belonging to different 
chains, we propose an econometric model of demand and supply to address the 
implication of retail competition on retailer category pricing.  
3.1 Demand Model 
We model our demand function as a nested logit with SKU choice at the lowest level, 
then category purchase incidence, followed by store choice at the highest level. Figure 
1.1 illustrates the consumer decision tree. We refer readers to Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985) for a more detailed exposition of this demand specification. 
Households are denoted by the subscript i (i=1,2,…,N), SKU by j (j=1,2,…,J), 
category purchase incidence by c (buy or no buy), stores by s, and shopping trip  by t.  
For a three-dimensional choice set (store, incidence, SKU), the utility from alternative 
j for household i in store s at time t is given by  
                                   ijcst ijcst icst ist ist icst ijcstU V V V ε ε ε= + + + + +                                     (1)   
where ,  and are the deterministic components and ijcstV icstV istV ε ’s are the stochastic 
components of consumer utility. Assuming that theε ’s are Gumbel distributed leads 
to a nested logit demand model. Eachε in the utility specification in equation (1) has a 
scale/dissimilarity/log-sum parameter associated with it. These are denoted by bµ , incµ  
and  for SKU, category purchase incidence and store choice levels respectively. For sµ
identification, we normalize one of the scale parameters, b 1µ = .  
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Store Choice 
S2S1
 
Purchase Incidence
Buy      No Buy        NoBuy Buy
 
 SKU 
 Choice 
     O1        1        2    3            Oc1      Oc2        1        2       3       O2
FIGURE 1.1: Consumer decision tree 
3.1.1 Model For SKU  Choice – Conditional on Store Choice and Category          
Purchase Incidence  
The probability that household i purchases SKU j during shopping trip t in store s is 
denoted as . The vector of covariates includes SKU constant, price, SKU loyalty, 
feature, display and assortment depth (number of SKUs of focal brand)
ijcstP
3. The 
assortment depth measure is used to capture the effect of brand salience on retailers’ 
shelf on consumer utility and, hence, choice. In particular, does the presence of many 
SKUs of same brand affect consumer utility of a particular SKU?4 These covariates 
                                                 
3 The implicit assumption thoughout the modeling approach is that of rational expectations. We make 
the rational expectations assumption largely for methodological simplicity. The Bell and Lattin (1998) 
study of consumer demand relaxes the rational expectations assumption by using information from 
previous consumer shopping trips to inform consumer expectations of retailer activities in future store 
visits. Relaxing the rational expectations assumption is non- trivial in an equilibrium based model since 
this would warrant that retailers account for inter-temporal dependencies in their actions, i.e a dynamic 
model. Proposing a dynamic structural model of demand and supply while accounting for complexities 
of our model is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is a potentially interesting area for future 
research.  
 
4 There are several ways of increasing brand salience on retail shelf. For example, a retailer can a) stock 
multiple SKUs of a brand, b) use multiple facings of SKUs, or c) use many facings of some SKUs, etc. 
In the absence of data on facings, we are limited to capturing brand salience through a) alone. The 
author thanks Ram Rao and B.P.S. Murthi for bringing this model limitation to our attention. 
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are denoted by Xjcst.  The SKU constant captures the effect of time invariant SKU 
fixed effects.   
To account for potential non-linear brand specific assortment effects on consumer 
utility (Draganska and Jain, 2001), we include a linear-quadratic specification of 
assortment depth (number of SKUs belonging to the same brand as SKU j).  
   
The vector of population mean covariate effects is denoted by β . All covariate effects 
are allowed to be household-specific and the household i specific deviation of 
covariate effects is denoted by iβ∆ .  
  
Hence, the effect of covariates for household i is given by β  + iβ∆ . Similarly, the 
mean responsiveness to price across households is α  and the household i specific 
deviation for the responsiveness to price is iα∆ . We assume that consumer response 
to marketing mix variables is store and time invariant. In this paper, we use random 
coefficients specification to account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity. In 
addition to Xjcst, there could be factors that are SKU-store-time specific that are 
invariant across households and influence household choices. These unobserved 
attributes might include factors like number of shelf facings of j, location on shelf, in-
store feature, etc. These factors denoted by jcstξ  can be correlated with price for that 
alternative. Failure to account for such correlation results in a biased estimate of the 
mean price response coefficient (Berry et al., 1995; Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999). 
Conditional on category purchase incidence c and store choice s at time t, making the 
logit distributional assumption on ijcstε , the conditional choice probability that 
household i chooses SKU j at time t is given by  
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                cst
i ijst jst i jcst
ij|cst J
i ikst kst i kcst
k 1,k B
exp(( )p X ( ) )
P
exp(( )p X ( ) )
= ∈
α + ∆α + β+∆β +ξ=
α +∆α + β+∆β + ξ∑
                                (2) 
where Bcst  is a set of focal SKUs in store s during shopping trip t. Without losing 
generality and for the purpose of econometric identification, utility from one/some of 
the SKUs in the analysis can be set to zero. This one/composite outside option (the 
J+1th SKU) is viewed as the “outside good” at the SKU level. Therefore the recovered 
parameters, in reality, are values relative to parameters of the outside good.  
 
 3.1.2  Model of Category Purchase Incidence Conditional on Store Choice  
 
While equation (2) represents the conditional choice probability of one of the 
j=1,…J+1 SKUs, consumers might choose to not purchase in the category. This is the 
no-purchase option and is analogous to the outside good for category incidence. 
Hence a consumer decides to buy into a focal category if and only if the utility from 
buying into that focal category is greater than the consumer utility from buying into 
other categories. Setting the deterministic part of the utility  from no-purchase , ,i nobuy stV
option (no purchase of 1..J+1 alternatives conditional on store choice) to be zero 
results in the following expression for category purchase incidence (buying into 
category) 
        
' inc
i,buy,s,t i,buy,st
i,buy,st ' i
i,buy,s,t i,buy,st
exp{(V V )* }
P
1 exp{(V V )* }
+ µ= + + ncµ        
 where                                ( )
st
' b
i,buy,s,t jcstb j B
1V ln exp(V * )∈= µµ ∑  
 and                  i,buy,s,t c ic i,t 1 i i;t ,t 1 i i,t 1 i i;t ,t 1V (q R * ) (q R * )− − −= υ + υ + ς× − ∆ + ς − ∆ −               (3)                            
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incµ and bµ are the scale parameters for category purchase incidence and SKU choice 
decisionε ’s and  is the indirect utility from purchase in focal category i,buy,s,tV
independent of .  In order to account for household consumption and inventory 'i,buy,stV
levels, we calculate the household inventory recursively for each shopping trip.5 A 
similar approach has been used in Bucklin and Lattin (1991) and Gupta (1988) and 
Chintagunta (1993). We assume a constant consumption rate computed in the 
initialization sample. Let Ri denote the consumption rate (units/day, i.e. tissue 
rolls/day) for household i. Hence if i;t ,t 1−∆ is the elapsed time (in days) since last 
purchase in category, then i i;t ,t 1R * −∆ is the total number of units consumed since last 
purchase. If  denotes the number of units (rolls of tissue) purchased in the i,t 1q −
previous trip,6 then the expression for in equation (3) represents the indirect i,buy,s,tV
utility for household i from the focal category via a) the household time invariant 
intrinsic preference for the focal category and b) available household inventory during 
shopping trip t. 
 
The 1 in the denominator of equation (3) is the result of setting the deterministic part 
of the outside good (no purchase option) to zero. 
  
3.1.3 Store Choice Model 
Bell and Lattin (1998) and Bell et al. (1998) conjecture a relationship between store 
choice and store-expenditure.  To account for this relationship, we use expenditure on 
                                                 
5 I thank Ambar Rao and Seethu Seetharaman for identifying the need to control for inventory even 
within a single SKU and Sachin Gupta for the appropriate model specification. 
  
6 While our model accounts for effects of multi-pack SKUs such as a multiple-roll pack of tissues, 
multi-pack beer SKUs or multi-pack carbonated drinks, we do not build an explicit model of quantity 
purchased as in Chintagunta (1993) and Chiang (1992). Hence our model is more appropriate for 
categories where consumers rarely stockpile SKUs and where SKUs might differ in size. This is the 
case with our focal category, toilet tissues, as explained later in the data and estimation sections. 
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current trip interacted with store specific dummy as a covariate in the consumers’ 
store choice model. To capture the role of price image of the store on consumers’ 
store choice probability, we add the average price of featured SKUs in the focal 
category, as another explanatory variable in the store choice model. A linear-quadratic 
specification of assortment breadth (total number of SKUs in category) captures 
potential non-linear category specific assortment effects on consumer utility. These 
factors are denoted by Zst.  
The store choice model is given by  
                                     
st i ist
ist S
gt i igt
g 1
exp(Z ( ) V ' )P
exp(Z ( ) V ' )
=
γ + ∆γ +=
γ + ∆γ +∑
                                        (4) 
    where               ( )
st
'
ist idsts d E
1V ln exp(V *∈= µ ∑ s )  µ                                              (5) 
Est is the set of incidence decisions [incidence (buy) or no-incidence (no-buy)] 
conditional on store choice s, and S is the total number of stores. 
The nested demand model is therefore given by                                                                                          
                                                     ijcst ij|cst ic|st istP P *P *P=                                                  (6) 
which implies 
         
i ,buy ,s ,t
i ,buy ,s ,t
cst
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1 exp{(V V )* }exp(( )p X ( ) )
exp(Z ( ) V ' )*
exp(Z ( )
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S
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g 1
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                                      (7) 
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To capture unobserved consumer heterogeneity we assume that the individual 
response parameters  come from a multivariate normal distribution  i i i i[   ]= α β γΘ '
                                
i
*
i h h
i
N  ,  such that  + , ~ P ( )ϑ
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤α αα⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥β Ω β = β ϑ ϑ ϑ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥γ⎜ ⎟γ γ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
Σ  
where  is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Σ Ω  and  is a multivariate *P ( )ϑ ϑ
normal distribution with zero mean. 
  
Gathering terms that vary across households and those that do not, equation (7) can be 
written as follows                                              
      
cst
'
jst ijst icst icst st ist
ijcst J nobuy S
'
kst ikst gt igtimst imst
k 1,k B g 1m buy
exp( ) exp(V V ) exp( )P * *
exp( ) exp( )exp(V V )
= ∈ ==
δ +ω + σ=
δ +ω σ + κ+∑ ∑∑
+κ
                 (8)                           
where 'jst jst jst jcstp Xδ α β= + +ξ           ijst ijst jst i(p , X ) 'ω = ηΣ          st st stZ Vσ = γ + '
                                                                                                      (9)                 ist st ist i(Z ,V ' )κ = ηΣ
 
 Here  and are the mean utilities across households for SKU j and store s in jstδ stσ
week t respectively. Notice from equation (9) that the term jstδ contains the mean 
effects of marketing activities as well as the unobserved attribute term jcstξ , a feature 
we exploit in our estimation procedure to correct for endogeneity.  
 
3.2 Supply Model  
Assuming that retailers set prices to maximize category profits, the category profit for 
store s in week t is given by  
                                                      ( )
st
st jst jst jst t
j B
p mc S M
∈
Π = −∑                                     (10) 
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where Sjst is the share of  SKU j in store s in week t and Mt is the market size in week 
t. mcjst is the marginal cost of j in store s at time t. Sjst can be viewed as the fraction of 
trips to store s in week t that have led to purchase of j7.  
 
3.2.1 Modeling Cost  
The Besanko, Gupta and Jain (1998) and the Sudhir (2001) studies use data from a 
single retail account, and have access to wholesale price net of trade promotions for 
their focal categories. This enables these studies to account for wholesale price levels 
in their retail category pricing analysis. Observed retail prices and manufacturer 
wholesale prices facilitate recovery of retailer markups from the estimation of the 
retailer pricing rules. In this regard, data used for the current study pose some 
limitations. While the data used in this study overcome the single retail account 
limitation of data used in previous studies, they do not contain manufacturer deals to 
individual retailers/retail accounts. Since manufacturer deals to retailers and retail 
competition affect retailer category pricing decisions (Lal and Villas-Boas, 1998; 
Pesendorfer, 2001), a key modeling challenge for us is to account for manufacturer-
retailer dealings/retailer costs unobserved in our data.  
The literature recognizes several factors that influence retailers’ cost structure, such as 
wholesale prices (Besanko, Gupta and Jain, 1998; Sudhir,2001); manufacturer 
induced trade-promotions (Dreze and Bell 2000; Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997); 
and lump-sum side payments (Blattberg and Neslin, 1990; Chintagunta, 2002). While 
the Robinson-Patman Act prevents manufacturers from discriminating on wholesale 
prices among competing retailers within a trading region, manufactures can employ 
                                                 
7 Since the focus of this paper is very different from that of Chintagunta (2002) and Sudhir (2001), we 
do not test for strategic departures from the standard category profit maximization assumption. This is 
not a modeling limitation, however, and can be easily accommodated in our estimation.  
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instruments like the ones listed above to discriminate among competing retailers. This 
means retailers can potentially face different costs (Shugan and Desiraju, 2001).  
Consequently, an empirical methodology would be needed that can estimate these 
retailer varying cost factors from the data -- and then explain their role on the 
retailers’ pricing behavior when coupled with retail competition and demand side 
factors.  
We achieve this by parameterizing the marginal costs of retailers to include retailer-
specific costs due to manufacturer deals and retail assortments. By allowing retailer-
specific manufacturer deals, we try to account for manufacturer-retailer dealings jstW -- 
net of wholesale prices, side-payments, quantity discounting and trade-promotions 
activities unobserved by the econometrician.  
Like the demand model that is developed at the SKU-store-week level, the cost model 
for retailer is parameterized at the SKU-store-week level as follows 
                                         21 2* *jst jst s jst s jst s jstmc W Asst Asstτ λ λ= + + +ς                        (11) 
where Wjst is the manufacturer deal price of SKU j to store s at time t and  jstς  is a 
zero mean stochastic cost shock. Note that not only does our specification allow for 
costs to vary across retailers, but it also allows for retailers to react differently to these 
cost factors.  
 
While deGroote (1994), Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) and Draganska and Jain (2001) 
focus on costs incurred by manufacturers as a result of adding variants to their product 
lines, van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and Krishnan et al. (2002) focus on retailer level 
costs of assortment. While setup costs might be small for the retailer, constrained shelf 
space forces a retailer to make tradeoffs in assortments in order to minimize costs due 
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to stock-outs and overstocking. Increasing assortment may decrease demand for each 
SKU in the product category and increase variability of demand and, therefore, 
inventorying costs. 
 
Faced with limited shelf space, retailers often charge premium slotting fees as an 
incentive to stock more variants of the manufacturers’ product line. The amount can 
be as high as $10 per facing per week (AC Nielsen, 2000 survey). These arrangements 
can be moderated by retailer-manufacturer negotiations, retailer-specific shelf space 
and inventory/storage restrictions.  
  
Substituting (11) in (10) and taking partial derivate of (10) with respect to pjst, yields 
the first order optimization rule for price pjst given by  
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The system of equations given by equation (12) forms the estimation equations for 
pricing rules for category profit maximizing retailers with retail competition. It’s 
worth pointing out that 
                                               * *
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where  is the set of all households making shopping trips in week t, and Dt∆ it indexes 
the number of trips made by household i in week t8. 
 
4.  Data And Estimation 
 
4.1 Data 
We estimate our model using the IRI database that includes purchase histories of 520 
households over two years (June 1991-June 1993) in five grocery stores. The stores 
include two Every Day Low Price (EDLP) format stores and three promotion or HILO 
stores. Two of the HILO stores belong to the same retail chain. There are 24 product 
categories in the data. However we selected tissues as the focal category in this study 
for the following reasons: a) large number of repeat purchases by households b) 
significant price and assortment variation across stores and c) we do not observe 
households buying multiple SKUs or multiple quantities of same SKU in the data9, 
which makes the results not very sensitive to our discrete quantity/choice assumption. 
 
Table 1.1 reflects the descriptive statistics for the sample, pooling observations across 
the five stores.  Table 1.2 provides detailed store level statistics. It suggests that while 
there is cross-sectional variation in price and assortment across stores, there isn’t 
much longitudinal variation in category assortment breadth within a store.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Our specification assumes that the sample is representative of the market, and firms set prices based 
on the behavior of the panelists. In future work we will try to relax this assumption by combining micro 
(panel) data and macro (store SKU level) data. 
 
9 Twenty-eight of the 520 households buy multiple SKUs during a shopping trip. 
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While there is variation in assortment size across stores, a closer examination of the 
data suggests a) each store maintains a consistent number of SKUs in the category and 
b) assortment size changes (if any) do not happen on a week-by-week basis. Therefore 
we treat assortment size to be an exogenous decision10.   
 
TABLE 1.1 – Descriptive Statistics For Full Sample (All Shopping Trips) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
SKU’s purchased 1.455162 0.898774 1 24 
Price (per unit) 0.957153 0.220833 0.48 1.63 
Feature 1.438581 1.552719 0 4 
Display 0.962947 1.485691 0 7 
Trip Expenditure 25.46179 30.10319 0 378.4 
Assortment Breadth 16.51 2.1324 11 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Maintaining consistent assortments can be a strategic choice on the part of retailers. Modeling this 
choice is beyond the scope and focus of the current study. We do, however, intend to address this issue 
in future research.   
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TABLE 1.2 (a) – Descriptive Statistics By Store (Only Purchase Observations) 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SKU’s Purchased 1091 1.669111 1.240579 1 24 
Coupon_Val 1091 5.202567 15.86307 0 128 
Price 1091 0.867021 0.154431 0.48 1.28 
Feature 1091 1.048579 1.414352 0 4 
Display 1091 0.425298 0.739862 0 4 
Assortment Breadth 104 18.125 1.580755 13 21 
EDLP  1 
 
 
 
 
 
  EDLP  2 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SKU’s Purchased 1603 1.569557 0.862231 1 7 
Coupon_Val 1603 3.28821 14.14657 0 192 
Price 1603 0.922633 0.131381 0.58 1.28 
Feature 1603 1.144105 1.433876 0 3 
Display 1603 1.414223 2.028658 0 7 
Assortment Breadth 104 14.66346 1.604669 11 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HILO 1 
                     
  
  
  
   
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SKU’s Purchased 2432 1.332237 0.77697 1 13 
Coupon_Val 2432 5.956826 15.59518 0 189 
Price 2432 0.938409 0.190867 0.49 1.63 
Feature 2432 1.962582 1.630589 0 4 
Display 2432 0.844984 1.025499 0 6 
Assortment Breadth 104 15.98077 1.190421 14 18 
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TABLE 1.2 (b)– Descriptive Statistics By Store (Only Purchase Observations) 
(continued) 
 
HILO 2 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SKU’s Purchased 591 1.263959 0.553605 1 4 
Coupon_Val 591 2.592217 13.58942 0 149 
Price 591 1.109492 0.316599 0.49 1.63 
Feature 591 1.128596 1.312409 0 4 
Display 591 1.441624 1.926504 0 5 
Assortment Breadth 104 17.10577 1.253487 14 20 
 
 
HILO 3 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SKU’s Purchased 684 1.372807 0.745837 1 7 
Coupon_Val 684 3.669591 12.99889 0 113 
Price 684 1.143801 0.311614 0.49 1.63 
Feature 684 0.975146 1.308032 0 4 
Display 684 0.73538 1.434313 0 4 
Assortment Breadth 104 15.98077 1.190421 14 18 
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4.2 Estimation 
The focus of this study is to model households’ category purchase decisions among 
five competing retailers. However in the data, choices at the individual level are fairly 
sparse. Therefore, we need an estimation procedure that can estimate the proposed 
demand model at the individual level, even with limited household level data. The 
hierarchical Bayes estimation framework is an ideal fit for such a situation. The 
hierarchical Bayes, (henceforth HB) estimation framework pools information across 
individuals (Gelfand and Smith 1990; Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby, 1996). Thus 
the HB procedure allows sharing of information across subjects, and the inference of 
household specific parameters in a single, unified framework. This estimation 
procedure, therefore, allows us to get a more detailed understanding of the effects of 
retailers’ decisions on household choices. In this approach, household specific 
parameters are drawn from a normal distribution as explained in the model 
development section. A similar approach has been employed by Chintagunta et al. 
(2003), although they use a simulated maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
Although the Bayes estimates and the simulated maximum likelihood estimates are 
asymptotically equivalent (Huber and Train, 2003), they might yield different results 
for small samples.    
 
The first stage of the estimation procedure results in a full set of household-invariant 
weekly fixed effects , which capture the mean utility from each SKU-store-week jstδ
combination. One should note that the fixed effects subsume in them the mean effects 
of the marketing mix variables and the unobserved component ξ . Rewriting (8) we 
have 
cst
'
jst ijst icst st ist
ijcst J nobuy S
'
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We will make the following distributional assumptions in order to be able to estimate 
the model for an arbitrary household. The random effects parameters , are 
distributed 
iΘ
Nr(Θ ,Ξ ), i.e., the r-dimensional multivariate normal distribution with 
mean vector  and covariance matrix Θ Ξ . Using Bayes rule (e.g., Gelman et al., 
1995), we obtain information about the household specific parameters , and the 
common parameters of the mixing distribution 
iΘ
Θ , Ξ , by reformulating the likelihood 
function as a hierarchical Bayes model. The likelihood function is 
   
1
( , , ) Prob( | , , ) ( ) ( | , )
N
i i i i
i
L data L N
=
Θ Θ Ξ ≡ Θ Θ Ξ = Θ Θ Θ Ξ∏ i
i i iwhere is the likelihood of household i's data conditional on . From Bayes 
rule we know that the joint posterior distribution of the parameters is proportional to 
the likelihood times the prior distribution, that is  
( )L Θ Θ
1
( , , | ) ( ) ( | , ) ( , )
N
i i i i
i
P data L N g
=
Θ Θ Ξ ∝ Θ Θ Θ Ξ Θ Ξ∏  
In this formulation the mixing distribution is part of the prior distribution, where 
 is a prior distribution placed on ( , )g Θ Ξ Θ and Ξ  in order to make sure that the joint 
posterior distribution will be defined. For convenience we use natural conjugate priors 
in which the prior on  is normal and the prior on Θ Ξ  is the inverted Wishart 
distribution. Draws from this joint posterior distribution are obtained through Gibbs 
sampling. That is, a sequence of conditional draws is obtained where each parameter 
is drawn conditional on a draw from the other parameters. See Casella and George 
(1992) and Smith and Gelfand (1992) for more information on the Gibbs sampler. In 
Gibbs sampling, draws of Θ  are obtained from its posterior conditional on draws of 
 and . Similarly, draws of iΘ Ξ i∀ Ξ are obtained from its posterior conditional on 
and  for . The Gibbs sampling provides a set of draws of from its 
posterior distribution, and it is the mean of these draws that is the desired parameter 
estimate. Interested readers may refer to Allenby and Lenk (1994), Allenby and Rossi 
Θ iΘ i∀ iΘ
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(1999), Chib et al. (1998), Huber and Train (2000), and Gelman et al. (1995) for a 
more detailed explanation of the computation procedure. 
 
At this stage of the estimation process we obtain the SKU-store-week specific fixed 
effects, variance of the household varying (heterogeneity) parameters and the 
variance-covariance matrix for these. Note that we don’t need to rely on any inversion 
techniques (e.g. Goolsbee and Petrin, 2001) or contraction mapping procedure like 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to recover the fixed effects. Since the asymptotic 
properties of the estimator are well understood, and the simulated maximum 
likelihood estimates of the demand model are recovered, the proposed estimation 
procedure is more efficient than the ones that rely on contraction mapping 
(Chintagunta et al. 2002). 
  
Next we regress the estimated SKU-store-week fixed effects jstδ  on the respective 
marketing mix variables. Note that the unobserved component  subsumed in the ξ
fixed effect now acts as the error term for second stage regression.  can be ξ
correlated with one or many of the regressors, hence the OLS estimator is 
inconsistent. We therefore employ the 2SLS estimator to recover the mean response 
parameters while instrumenting for price and assortment breadth.  
'jst jst jst jcstp Xδ α β
∧ = + +ξ  
Since we do not have wholesale prices in our data, we rely on manufacturer level 
production factor price indices11 along with two-week lags of retail prices 12 as 
instruments for price, and two-week lags assortment depth as instruments for 
                                                 
11 Weekly price indices for paper pulp, resins and plastic were obtained from the Chicago Mercantile 
Stock Exchange and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
12 We checked for robustness of our specification by increasing number of lags. The results do not 
change substantively. 
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assortment depth (brand level). Since manufacturers differ in their production 
efficiencies and can offer different prices per SKU to retailers, we interact the input 
factor cost shifters with the respective SKU and store dummies.  
 
If V is the matrix of instruments and E a matrix containing X, Z and jstp , the 
population mean parameters [  ]α β  are given by  
1[  ]=[ ' '] ' jstV VE E Eα β δ
∧−Ω Ω  
where   
1( ' ) 'V V V V V
−Ω =  
The standard errors are given by 
2 1[  ]=s [ ' ]VVar E Eα β −Ω  
where 
2 ( ) '(s
jst jstjst jst jst jstp X p X
T K
)δ α β δ α∧ ∧− + − += −
β
 
and K is dimension of β +1 (to account for α ). 
 
Treating the demand parameters as given, we estimate a system of first order 
optimization rules for price for the competing stores. Here we regress (12) to recover 
the marginal cost parameters 1,s sτ λ and 2sλ . 
 
5.  Results  
A homogenous nested logit based demand model is used as the base model13. 
Inference of the full model, i.e. mixed nested logit, is made using hierarchical Bayes 
                                                 
13 A demand model wherein the three consumer choice decisions are modeled as being independent, i.e. 
joint demand model is the product of three independent logits, was also estimated. Interested readers 
can contact the authors for these results. 
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estimation procedure after discarding the first 5000 draws in the burn-in period 
(Gelman and Rubin, 1992). In Table 1.3, we present the estimates for the two demand 
models a) the Base Model (homogenous nested logit) and b) Full Model (mixed 
nested logit).  
 
The Full model that accounts for consumer heterogeneity outperforms the Base model 
(AIC Full Model<AIC Base Model and BIC Full Model< BIC Base Model). As 
explained in the model specification section, we observe that the SKU intercepts are 
smaller in the Full Model than Base Model. This is because some of the variance due 
to unobserved taste heterogeneity was being incorrectly attributed to the SKU 
intercepts in the Base Model. Note that the mean price response coefficient is 
underestimated when we do not account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The 
average price of the featured items in the category, i.e. the price image variable, has a 
statistically significant effect on the store choice decision. Like the Bell et al. (1998) 
study, we find a direct effect of consumer trip expenditure on consumer store choice 
decisions.  
 
EDLP stores on average have larger store intercepts than HILO stores. Accounting for 
both the signs and magnitudes of the estimates for a) store intercepts and b) trip 
expenditure, suggests that consumers who spend more (large basket shoppers) -- all 
else being -- equal prefer EDLP stores to HILO stores, a result consistent with Bell 
and Lattin (1998). The average price elasticities for SKU choice and store choice are 
1.83 and 1.28 respectively. This means a 1% reduction in retailer’s price of an SKU 
results in a 1.83% increase in the choice probability of that SKU, while a 1% 
reduction in the retailer’s average price of featured items results in 1.28% increase in 
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choice probability of that SKU. There is also significant heterogeneity in the response 
to price. 
 
The demand model results indicate that consumers are making tradeoffs in price and 
assortment. The corresponding heterogeneity parameters reflect that there is 
significant heterogeneity in preference for assortment depth and breadth. Since we 
have two measures of assortment, we can compute consumer willingness to pay for 
assortment breadth and depth. We find that consumers are willing to pay 1.09 cents 
per SKU for a 1% increase in assortment depth and .24 cents per SKU for a 1% 
increase in assortment breadth. Thus, in our data consumers have stronger preference 
for assortment depth than assortment breadth, as demonstrated in their willingness to 
pay for assortments.  
 
A summary of the signs and significance of the individual-specific effects is given in 
Table 1.4. The second column represents the number of households whose preference 
parameter for the corresponding explanatory variable in the first column is less than 
zero. The third column is the corresponding number of households whose preference 
parameter is significantly less than 0 at the 5% level (p-<.05) and the fourth column is 
the number of households whose corresponding preference parameter is significantly 
greater than 0 at the 5% level (p+<.05). The results indicate that most consumers are 
estimated to derive negative utility from higher prices and shopping trip expenditures, 
and positive utility from assortment depth and breadth. This provides face validity to 
the estimated individual-level posterior demand estimates. We also find diminishing 
marginal utility in both assortment depth and breadth. 
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Note from Table 1.3, the log sum/dissimilarity parameters for category incidence and 
store choice decisions are significant and their magnitudes are consistent with utility 
maximization14 (µs = .05, µc =0.11). The statistical significance of these parameters 
supports dependence between the three consumer decisions of consumer store choice, 
category purchase incidence and SKU choice.  
 
The supply side estimates are presented in Table 1.5. Consistent with the theoretical 
predictions, we find that assortment affects retailer costs. Since our marginal cost 
specification is store specific, we compute the cost elasticities due to assortments 
across EDLP and HILO stores. The marginal cost elasticity due to assortment 
averaged across all five stores is 1.2. This means that all else being equal, if a retailer 
increases its assortment breadth by 1% , its marginal cost increases by 1.2%. The ratio 
of marginal elasticities of EDLP and HILO stores is .84. This suggests that EDLP 
stores are more efficient in increasing assortment breadth than HILO stores.  
 
As explained in the estimation section, the analytics developed in this study can be 
used by retailers to get a more detailed understanding of effects of their marketing mix 
decisions on household choices while accounting for response from competitors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 To be consistent with utility maximization, the log-sum parameters must be in the range (0,1]. 
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TABLE 1.3– Demand Model Results 
   
   
Hie  M ted 
mand 
rarchical Bayes
Logit De
ixed Nes
Model 
   
Homogenous Nested Logit 
Dem odel Hete eity and M Mean rogen
  P E  E  E e arameter stimate stimate stimat
SKU CHOICE 
ODEL M SKU1 -3.09 -1.90 5.61 
  SKU2 -2.26 -0.92 4.42 
  SKU3 -2.65 -0.73 2.72 
  SKU4 -2.44 -0.89 6.91 
  SKU5 -2.67 -0.99 5.42 
  SKU6 -2.49 -0.90 1.93 
  SKU7 -2.07 -0.80 5.73 
  SKU8 -2.42 -0.89 1.25 
  SKU9 -2.04 -0.79 8.90 
  SKU10 -2.25 -0.77 8.95 
  Price -1.31 -2.08 2.26 
  Assort. Depth 3.72 0.20 0.90 
  As h2sort. Dept -0.09 -0.08 0.12 
CATEGORY 
INCIDENCE 1/µc 9.35 8.73  
STORE 
HOICE C EDLP1 6.03 7.01 3.98 
  EDLP2 1.33 1.39 7.53 
  HILO1 -0.61 -1.75 2.28 
  HILO2 -0.53 -1.15 8.01 
  Average Price -0.27 -2.31 4.33 
  Assort. Breadth 0.14 0.30 11.15 
  Assor adth2 -  -  0.77 t. Bre 0.03** 0.09**
  Trip Spend -0.78 -0.64 12.96 
  1/µs 26.82 18.35  
Number of 
89056 Observations 
Numb
 Case
er of 
s 2118710 
Log Likelihood  -55052.00 -31023.12 
AIC 8096.10 10162.00 
BIC 11410.17 8167.69 
* implies statistically not significant
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TABLE 1.4 – Individual Main Effects 
 
Covariates # ( 0β < ) # ( 0β < ) (p-<.05) # ( 0β > ) (p+<.05) 
Price 485 412 21 
Assortment Depth 18 9 489 
Assortment 
Depth2
501 467 18 
Feature 39 13 457 
Display 128 104 156 
Average Price 518 491 15 
Assortment 
Breadth 
264 243 194 
Assortment 
Breadth2
412 42 56 
Trip Spend 503 444 17 
 
 
Using the proposed demand and supply models, retailers can identify a) which 
households are store loyal and which households are more prone to store switching b) 
which households are price/assortment sensitive and c) which households are more 
sensitive to assortment depth or assortment breadth. Answers to these questions 
provide valuable insights for retailer category pricing.  
 
We use the estimated demand and supply models to conduct two policy experiments. 
We examine the equilibrium implications of a) assortment reduction and b) price 
promotions via targeted/customized coupons on retailer profits. 
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TABLE 1.5 – Supply Side Estimates 
 
  Parameter Estimate 
EDLP1 1.36 
Store Intercept EDLP2 2.55 
  HILO1 3.00 
  HILO2 4.11 
  HILO3 3.19 
EDLP1 7.25 
Assortment Breadth EDLP2 5.31 
  HILO1 12.13 
  HILO2 7.43 
  HILO3 7.52 
EDLP1 0.53** Assortment 
Breadth2 EDLP2 0.23** 
  HILO1 0.49 
  HILO2 0.42** 
  HILO3 0.27** 
Plastic EDLP1 0.08 
  EDLP2 1.13 
  HILO1 1.67 
  HILO2 1.69 
  HILO3 2.66 
Paper EDLP1 3.24 
  EDLP2 3.86 
  HILO1 4.00 
  HILO2 3.38 
  HILO3 -4.26** 
Resins EDLP1 0.77 
  EDLP2 0.47 
  HILO1 1.08 
  HILO2 1.05** 
  HILO3 1.73 
   
 
** implies not statistically significant 
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6. Policy Experiments 
6.1. Assortment reduction  
The question of assortment reduction has recently been receiving considerable 
attention. The previous studies differ both in terms of methodology and data used. In 
an experimental setting, Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister (1998) find consumers’ 
assortment perceptions -- hence sales -- to be unchanged even after dramatic reduction 
in the number of SKUs in the category. This suggests that retailers can reduce their 
assortment without any significant change or decrease in sales.   
 
In contrast to the previous finding, in a field study Dreze, Hoch, and Purk (1994) 
show that aggregate sales went up nearly 4% when 10% of the less popular SKUs 
were deleted, while dedicating greater shelf space to more popular items. Boatwright 
and Nunes’ (2001) study of an online grocery retailer also finds a significant increase 
in category sales as a result of assortment reduction.   
 
Borle et al. (2002) find significant reduction in consumer purchase frequency and 
purchase quantity as a result of assortment reductions.  Fox et al. (2003) show 
consumers’ spending levels to be sensitive to both retail assortment levels and varying 
across retail formats.   
 
Hence there is conflicting evidence on the effects of category level assortment 
reduction at retail sales. While previous studies have tried to understand how 
assortment reduction affects retail sales, the proposed structural model allows us to 
understand how assortment reductions affect retail profits. Using the calibrated 
demand and supply models, we conduct two exercises to study the implications of 
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assortment reduction on consumer choice and retailer profits.  We thereby address the 
need identified by Fox et al. (2003) to understand the implications of assortment 
reduction on store patronage.   
 
We simulate two exogenous assortment reduction scenarios.  
a) Scenario 1: A single SKU manufacturer (manufacturer of the smallest share 
focal SKU) exits the market, i.e. a brand is removed from assortment of all 
retailers.  In the face of competitive pressure, manufacturers often crop their 
product lines. Hence this policy experiment helps shed light on the 
implications of manufacturer decisions on retailer profits. 
b) Scenario 2: A retail account manager might decide to reduce the retail shelf 
space for the focal category to accommodate expansion of other categories. 
Before making this decision, an account manager might be interested in 
studying how their decision affects their category profits. We simulate such a 
scenario by studying the equilibrium profit implications when the retail 
account manager of the HILO store managing two HILO stores in the data 
drops the SKU with the smallest share in its stores.   
 
We compute household level choices and equilibrium prices after dropping the 
respective items in scenarios 1 and 2.  Our computed demand results indicate 
significant decrease in category purchase incidence and store choice probabilities 
across both scenarios from numbers without assortment reduction.  
 
In scenario 1 the category purchase incidence and store traffic reduction is larger for 
HILO stores than EDLP stores (2.87% vs. 1.003%). All retailers incur reduced profits 
from assortment reduction, with EDLP stores incurring smaller changes in profits than 
  
 42
HILO stores (.88% vs. 1.12%). Therefore we find evidence of asymmetric effects in 
assortment reduction across stores belonging to different price formats. In scenario 2 
the stores that reduce their assortment incur reduction in category profits (-1.01%) 
while the other stores gain in equilibrium profits. The gains are asymmetric with the 
third HILO store gaining more than the two EDLP stores (3.04% vs. 2.11%).  
 
Thus assortment reduction affects consumer decision of store choice, category 
incidence and SKU choice. Assortment reduction also affects retailers’ category 
profit, and these effects are sensitive to retailer price format.   
 
6.2. Targeted coupons 
 
Coupons enable firms to price discriminate between price-elastic and price-inelastic 
consumers (Narasimhan, 1984), thereby increasing firm profits. For example, Rossi 
and Allenby (1996) demonstrate that manufacturer profits from targeted coupons are 
as much as 2.5 times the profits from blanket coupon programs. Another view in the 
literature is that coupons reduce consumers’ switching costs, thereby increasing price 
competition (Shaffer and Zhang, 1995; Bester and Petrakis, 1996) and reducing 
equilibrium profits.  However, all these papers have considered only the perspective 
of manufacturers.  Our analysis provides empirical insights into the question of gains 
from targeted couponing by retailers.  
 
We simulate a scenario wherein retailers offer targeted coupons. We assume that 
retailers offer targeted coupons for the smallest share SKU, with the intent of 
increasing sales/share of that SKU. The computational approach is similar to Rossi et 
al. (1996). While Rossi et al. (1996) conduct their analysis for manufacturers, we 
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present an equilibrium solution accounting for retail competition. The objective is to 
calculate the optimal face value for household specific coupon for the lowest share 
SKU for each household-store-trip combination. For identification purposes, the 
analysis is conducted assuming that coupons are issued only to households having 
negative price preference parameter. The optimum face values are recovered by 
differencing the retail price (price offered to non-targeted consumers) from the 
optimal prices computed for each household-store-trip combination.  
 
We find stores on average offer lower face value coupons to high store and SKU loyal 
households than low store or SKU loyal households (22 cents vs. 39 cents). Also 
EDLP stores on average offer smaller face value coupons than HILO stores (ratio is 
.48). Furthermore while EDLP stores offer smaller face value coupons, they incur 
reduction in profits due to targeting (-3.43%), while higher face value issuing HILO 
stores gain in profits (+4.97%) due to targeted coupon programs. This is in part 
because targeted coupons result in a) a smaller increase in sales for EDLP than HILO 
stores and b) a larger reduction in equilibrium prices on other focal SKUs in EDLP 
stores than HILO stores. This result offers some rationale as to why HILO stores price 
promote while EDLP stores do not.   
 
7. Conclusion 
Issues of retail competition have not received as much attention in the structural 
modeling literature. We address this gap in the literature by modeling competition 
between grocery retail stores in a single category. We do this by proposing a unified 
utility structure that nests the three consumer decisions of store choice, category 
purchase incidence and SKU choice. We estimate the demand model using household 
scanner panel data while accounting for consumer heterogeneity. In addition to the 
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usually studied marketing-mix variables of price, feature and display, we also study 
the role of assortment breadth (number of SKUs in category) and assortment depth 
(number of SKUs of each brand) in the consumer choice process.  We study category 
level retail competition by specifying a Bertrand-Nash pricing game and estimate the 
resulting equilibrium pricing equations to obtain marginal cost estimates.   
 
We use the proposed structural model to address questions about retail competition 
such as: a) What tradeoffs do consumers make in price and assortments?  b) How does 
assortment reduction affect retailer profits? c) What are the implications for retailer 
profits if retailers were to issue targeted retail coupons? d) Are these effects different 
for retailers belonging to different price formats?  
 
To summarize, our empirical findings suggest price and assortment play a significant 
role in retail competition. We find that consumers do make tradeoffs in price and 
assortments, and are willing to pay more for greater assortment depth (more SKUs of 
a brand) than greater assortment breadth (more SKUs in category). Assortment also 
affects retailer costs. Assortment reduction and retailer issued targeted coupons affect 
equilibrium profits for retailers, and these effects vary by retailers’ price format. We 
find greater price and assortment competition between stores that belong to the same 
price format than across price formats. We hope that our proposed model and 
empirical findings spawn ideas for future research in the area.  
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 ESSAY 2 
PRICE-LOCATION LINKS IN CONSUMER AND COMPETITIVE CHOICES – 
AN APPLICATION OF THE GENERALIZED NESTED LOGIT STRUCTURAL 
ANALYSIS OF RETAIL COMPETITION15
 
Abstract 
To study how consumers make tradeoffs in price and location in retail contexts, we 
estimate a Generalized Nested Logit model (Wen and Koppelman, 2001) of demand.  
We account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity, and endogeneity in price and 
location.  We also estimate how firm pricing decision rules and the impact of location 
on firms’ cost structure.  The empirical application is to hotels in Texas 1991-1997.   
 
1. Introduction 
In this essay, we are interested in studying price competition among hotels at pre-
specified locations.  Industry classification, and hence competitive set definition, of 
hotels is based on price tiers.  However, it appears plausible that location attributes 
should also matter to the definition of competitive set. For example, a hotel (or 
property as it is known in the industry jargon) located at a favorable location might be 
able to charge a price premium relative to a property in the same price tier but at an 
unfavorable location.  And it might be competing more directly with a property in the 
same location but a different price tier than it does with a property of the same price 
                                                 
15 An earlier version of this essay was presented at the INFORMS Pricing Conference at Cornell 
University, August 2002.  We thank Pradeep Chintagunta, J.P. Dube, Naufel Vilcassim, K. Sudhir, and 
seminar participants at Northwestern-Kellogg, NYU-Stern, UCLA-Anderson and UC-Irvine, and 
conference attendees at INFORM-Pricing 2002 and at Marketing Science 2003, for their comments.  
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tier at a different location.   Location might also affect a property’s cost structure, and 
hence pricing, and hence its competitive set. 
 
To understand better how firms compete when price and location attributes matter, a 
critical first step is to understand consumer preferences for price and location 
attributes.  In other words, we need to first build a realistic model of consumer choice 
processes and their tradeoffs among various product attributes including price and 
location. These demand model estimates combined with a model of how location can 
influence costs can then form the basis of a supply analysis of firm price setting. We 
argue in this essay that the results of this exercise are very dependent on the consumer 
demand formulation, and therefore the appropriate choice model should be chosen to 
model consumer demand.  In particular, we argue that the generalized nested logit 
(Wen and Koppelman, 2001, GNL hereon) provides a robust tool to examine this 
problem for our industry and dataset context.    
 
First, the GNL has the advantage of allowing nesting structures in consumer choices, 
unlike the logit model. More importantly, unlike the nested logit, the GNL allows for 
endogenous nest estimation. In GNL, any choice alternative can be allocated to 
multiple nests simultaneously (the sum of all such allocations should of course add up 
to 100%).  This overlapping nests allows the accommodation of correlation in 
unobserved attributes between members belonging to different nests, which cannot be 
accommodated in nested logit. Therefore, cross-price elasticities between two 
alternatives includes both cross-price effects when they are present in the (multiple) 
same and in the (multiple) different nest. These features of the GNL make it a more 
appropriate demand specification when attributes tradeoffs and correlation between 
the utilities of different alternatives are not obvious ex-ante to the researcher. 
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These advantages of the GNL are especially relevant for our hotel price-location link 
study for the following two reasons.  First, industry studies indicate that while there 
are clear ideal points for demand (specifically, downtown and airport), the trade-offs 
in price and distance from these ideal points is not well known. Therefore, there could 
be some nesting structures in consumer choices that involve complex combinations of 
price and location.  Second, as we will discuss in our data section (data on Texas 
hotels for various cities over 1991-1997), we only observe price and location 
attributes of firms (and we know brand names), but there are several other attributes 
that matter to consumer choices for which we have no information (e.g., shopping 
arcade, swimming pool, gym etc.). These attributes might be the source of error 
correlation between alternatives either in the same nest or different nests. Therefore 
unlike nested logit, for our industry we cannot assume that consumer utility for 
alternatives belonging to different nests are uncorrelated.  
 
Given these advantages of the GNL for our industry and data, we use it as the demand 
model.  We model consumer utility as being a function of both prices and distances 
from two ideal points (downtown and airport).  Given demand and cost functions, 
hotel firms choose optimal price (that is, price is strategically and econometrically an 
endogenous variable). While we do not model location choices of firms (these 
decisions have already been made prior to our data observation period), we do account 
for the econometric endogeneity of location.     
 
To anticipate the results, we find location effects to be important both to consumers 
(and hence to firm revenues), as well as to firms’ costs.  On average, consumers prefer 
to be closer to downtown and away from the airport.  They are willing to pay $1.44 to 
be one mile closer to the central business district, and $1.22 to be one mile away from 
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the airport.  As an illustration of the importance of the right demand specification, we 
estimate a random-coefficient logit demand specification as well, given the 
widespread use of this model in (both location and non-location) choice models in 
marketing and economics.   Compared to the proposed model, a mixed logit model a) 
has poorer fit, b) yields statistically different price location response coefficients, and 
c) overpredicts consumer heterogeneity.   
 
The computed price elasticities for the GNL demand model exhibit patterns counter to 
popular industry classifications (example cross price elasticity between Sheraton (a 
higher priced or “luxury” brand) and Hilton (a middle-price tier or “midscale” brand) 
(0.71) is higher than the cross price elasticity between Sheraton and Marriott 
(midscale) (0.66) or Sheraton and Hyatt (luxury) (0.61).  We also find that firm costs 
increase as they move away from downtown and towards the airport.  From a 
substantial standpoint, this study therefore provides evidence for the interdependence 
of location and price decisions and the sensitivity of results to the estimated demand 
model used to examine competition in geographically differentiated oligopolies.  
 
In the following sections, we describe our proposed model in more detail (section 2) 
and contrast it to existing studies, discuss the data (section 3) and the results (section 
4). We conclude by summarizing and offering suggestions for future research (section 
5). 
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2. Model 
2.1. The rationale for a demand-and-supply model 
Starting with Hotelling (1929), there is a large stream of literature theoretical that 
focuses on how consumers make price-location trade-offs in choosing their retail store 
location.  Consumer makes these choices taking into account their transportation costs 
to these retail stores and the layout of the geographic space in which they exist (e.g., a 
linear city or a circular city).   Depending on these consumer preferences and 
geographic layout, retail stores then locate at dispersed points in the geographic space 
and choose appropriate prices.  In making these decisions, retail stores need to account 
for two opposing forces - locating in an area with higher density of demand might lead 
to more demand, but an attractive location might also attract other competitors and 
hence lead to lower profits.  In such a model, retail stores compete most with rivals 
located closest to them. Therefore, the theoretical literature in this area highlights the 
importance of examining both consumer and firm choices when modeling price-
location interactions. 
 
The predictions of these theoretical models on price-location competition have been 
tested empirically.  Despite the fact that theoretical models start with a demand 
specification, the majority of empirical work in this area does not model demand 
explicitly.  That is, the papers in this area focus on the supply or competition side 
alone, and characterize the correlation between equilibrium prices and equilibrium 
locations.  For example, Johnson and Parkman (1983) find in their study of cement 
market that profitability declines as firms locate near one another i.e. negative 
correlation between price and inter-firm distance.  Therefore, they conclude that firms 
compete most with those located closest to their own location.  Haining (1984) finds 
greater price clustering among neighboring outlets in urban gasoline retailing than 
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among non-neighboring outlets, providing further evidence of price-location 
interactions in firm decisions. Note however that price clustering can be consistent 
with both tacit collusion and perfect competition.  In Cotterill's (1986) study of the 
retail food industry in Vermont, distances between retail outlets have negligible 
effects on their prices, so price appears to be independent of location i.e. no price-
location interaction.   Here too this lack of effect could be due to perfectly competitive 
retailer markets, or perfectly collusive ones, or even due to upstream wholesaler 
power.   
 
Summarizing, these studies examine the correlation between price and location, or 
price and distance from competitors, and find that the evidence on price-location link 
is mixed.  A concern with all these studies is that we are unable to understand 
consumer preferences for prices and location, and the tradeoffs between these two.  
We are also unable to see how firms’ profits are influenced by costs of location at a 
favorable location relative to an unfavorable location.  Therefore, in this essay, we 
model demand and supply-side simultaneously . 
 
In modeling both demand and supply aspects of the location-price link, there is a 
growing stream of literature.  The questions asked here are: what are consumer 
preferences for price and location and how do these influence firm choices?  Do 
consumers have some ideal points for firm location?  How high are transportation 
costs?  Given these preferences and costs, where should firms locate and how should 
they price?  This recent stream of literature comprises papers by Seim (2001), Davis 
(2002), Kamita (2001), and Thomadsen (2001).    
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For the purpose of studying the lodging industry (the focal industry for this study), 
these studies make some assumptions that need to be relaxed.  Seim (2001) for 
example, models where video stores should locate in markets, using a reduced-form 
profit function.   She does not structurally model pricing by firms or consumer choices 
in this market. Hence her model precludes the possibility of studying consumer 
preference for price and location and price-location tradeoffs in competitive choices.  
Additionally, she defines markets exogenously by slicing up her area of study into 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cells.  This precludes the possibility of 
studying competition between retail outlets in various locations in a geographic 
differentiated oligopoly. Similar restrictive market definitions are imposed in the 
Davis (2002) study on movie theater pricing, Thomadsen (2001) model on the fast-
food industry, and Kamita (2001) the trash-hauling industry.  Another issue is that 
these papers use the logit/random coefficients logit demand model.  We believe the 
GNL model is more appropriate to our context than the logit or random coefficients 
logit for reasons discussed below.   
 
2.2 Modeling Demand   
Before we discuss our demand model for our industry (the Texas lodging industry), 
we first provide some comparison between GNL and other demand models used in 
research in marketing and economics.  There is a long history of utility-based 
structural demand modeling in marketing (e.g., Guadagni and Little 1983, Kamakura 
and Russell 1989, Krishnamurthi and Raj 1991, Chintagunta 1993).  Early choice 
models assumed that the error terms were multivariate normal or independently and 
identically Type I extreme value (Gumbel) distributed (Johnson and Kotz, 1970). The 
multivariate normal error distribution assumption leads to the multinomial Probit 
(MNP) model (Daganzo, 1979) while the i.i.d. Gumbel assumption leads to the 
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multinomial logit (MNL) model (McFadden, 1973). MNL and its variants are the 
most widely used in marketing. It is derived from first principles of utility 
maximization and its simple mathematical structure facilitates ease of estimation. 
However its independence of irrelevant alternatives property (IIA), leads to incorrect 
predictions due to MNL’s unrealistic restriction on the cross price elasticities between 
alternatives. The probit model allows complete flexibility in the variance covariance 
structure of the error terms but requires numerical integration of a multivariate normal 
distribution. The nested logit model, which allows interdependence between pairs of 
alternatives in a common group, is a widely known relaxation of the MNL, while 
retaining the closed form solution. 
 
An issue with the multinomial Probit model is the lack of closed form solutions and 
the resulting computational burden in estimation. Developments have been directed at 
reducing the computational burden associated with the model (McFadden, 1989; 
Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1990; Börsch Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1992; Keane, 
1994, Chintagunta, 2001).  Additionally, the use of random coefficients in 
multinomial logit and nested logit models using aggregate data not only incorporates 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences but also relaxes the IIA restriction (Sudhir 
2001, Nevo 2000).   Despite all this, for our purposes, the mixed logit might not offer 
the required level of flexibility of substitution patterns given the unique features of 
hotel choices and data discussed in the introduction.  
 
Another area of exciting methodological developments in recent years has been in the 
class of Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) models.  These developments have 
resulted in a number of new model forms that retain a closed form expression for 
choice probabilities, but offer much greater flexibility in the specification of the 
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correlation structure of the errors. In particular, consider the GNL, which allows for 
complex substitution patterns between alternatives. The homogeneous GNL proposed 
by Wen and Koppelman (2001), is derived from McFadden's (1978) generalized 
extreme value (GEV) model. Like the nested logit it allows error terms between 
alternatives in a nest to be correlated. The common error component across 
alternatives in a nest alleviates the IIA property of the MNL within nests. This feature 
of the GNL is similar to NL. In NL, an alternative is present in only one nest, allowing 
for error correlation between alternatives within a nest but not between alternatives 
belonging to different nests.   
 
However a situation often encountered in practice is that alternatives in different nests 
share some unobserved attributes, making the across nest error correlation assumption 
of the NL very restrictive (Train, 2003). For example attributes like on-site shuttle, 
gym, pool etc. can be shared by alternatives belonging to different nests.  However, 
these attributes are unobserved by the econometrician and can be a source of error 
correlation between alternatives belonging to different nests. The need for realistic 
representations of such choice situations has spawned developments in discrete choice 
models like GNL that allow for overlapping nests.  
 
The overlapping nests feature allows for non-zero error correlations between 
alternatives both within and across nests. As an example, consider a choice set with 
four alternatives (1,2, 3 and 4).  Assume alternatives 2 and 3 are similar to alternative 
1 in some attribute and to alternative 4 in another.  The standard nested logit cannot 
represent this structure because alternative 2 is present in both nests.  The GNL can 
allow a configuration of nests like nest 1 comprising (1,2,3) and nest 2 comprising 
(2,3,4) where alternatives 2 and 3 are present in both nests. Furthermore, the GNL 
  
 60
allows for alternatives to be present in varying degrees (through fractional allocation 
parameters) in each nest16. That is, continuing with the previous example, the GNL 
allows the following: alternative 2 is allocated 20% to nest 1 (1,2,3) and 80% to nest 2 
(2,3,4) at the same time that alternative 3 is allocated 75% to nest 1 (1,2,3) and 25% to 
nest 2 (2,3,4).  The GNL also estimates logsum parameters associated with each nest 
that are interpreted as how similar or dissimilar members of a nest are.   
 
Since the within nest elasticities are functions of the fractional allocation parameters, 
GNL allows for the pair-wise elasticity between two alternatives (say alternatives 2 
and 3 in our example) to be different in different nests (in nest 1 and 2 in our 
example), a unique feature of GNL. The overall pair-wise elasticity between 
alternatives (alternatives 2 and 3 in our case) accounts for both within nest and across 
nest (nests 1 and 2 in our example) presence.  Therefore it accommodates differential 
cross-price elasticities across pairs of alternatives both within and across nests17. This 
feature of the GNL makes it appealing for several situations in which nest 
membership is not obvious and/or if data contain information on only a subset of 
attributes used by consumers to make their choice.   
 
Comparing the GNL to other discrete choice models, the GNL does not suffer from 
the IIA property of the logit.  However unlike the probit, it has closed form solutions 
for individual level choice probabilities.  GNL nests MNL, NL (special case) and 
                                                 
16  The cross-nested logit (CNL) model (Vovsha, 1997) allocates a fraction of each alternative to a set 
of nests with equal logsum parameters across nests; the product differentiation (PD) model (Bresnahan 
et al, 1997) allocates each alternative to one nest along each of a set of pre-selected dimensions with 
allocation parameters associated with each dimension with equal logsum for nest in the same choice 
dimension. 
17  The allocation parameters within a nest are driven by combination of attribute levels of the 
alternatives in the nest and attributes unobserved in the model. Detailed explanation for this is 
presented later in this section. 
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other nested variants.  We propose a random coefficients GNL demand model, to 
account for unobserved consumer preference and error heterogeneity not accounted in 
Wen and Koppelman (2001)18.   
 
We now turn to the application of GNL to hotel demand.  Although the data we 
observe are annual sales of room nights, we motivate and estimate the demand model 
assuming discrete choice behavior at the individual level.  We use a technique 
developed in economics by Berry et al. (1995) and later used in marketing studies like 
Sudhir (2001), Chintagunta (2001) and Besanko et al. (1998). Here a consumer 
chooses a property from the available set of properties. The unit of demand is assumed 
to be a room-night 19.  When the individual demand is aggregated across all 
consumers within a year, we obtain the annual sales of room nights for each property. 
Thus, at the aggregate level the unit of observation is property level market shares 
where a market is defined as a city-year, implying that any property in a city can 
compete with any other, and not just those in the same geographic or price band 
(contrast this to the more restrictive market definitions in Seim (2001) or Davis (2002) 
where a market is defined as a pre-specified geographic area.  
 
On each travel occasion to a given market, a consumer selects a property from the 
available set of properties based on brand name, price per room night, and its 
geographic location; all properties in a city-year market are included in the choice set.  
                                                 
18 Swait (2000) proposes the Generalized MNL model, to simultaneously evaluate choice and choice set 
generation. The GenMNL model is identical to the GNL except that the allocation parameters are 
constrained to be equal.  The interplay between consumer choice and choice set formation is not the 
focus of this paper as is the case in Swait (2000). However accounting for choice set generation would 
be an interesting extension for future research in this area. 
19  At the individual level, consumers may buy multiple room nights on a travel occasion. In aggregate 
data we are unable to account for this behavior and have to treat the multiple units as independent 
discrete choices, resulting in a possible bias in the demand estimates. Similar discrete choice 
assumptions have been made in Sudhir (2001) and Chintagunta (2001). 
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Literature on the hospitality industry (e.g. Wall et al. 1985) indicates that travelers, 
who are the primary consumers of lodging services, prefer hotels that are located at 
one of two locations - central business district (CBD) and airport (AIR).  We treat 
these two locations as ideal points of consumers20.  Contrast this specification of 
distance from an ideal point to the more common specification of distance from a 
latitude-longitude intersection used in Seim (2001), Davis (2002), etc.  In our 
industry, it is unlikely that consumers will value all locations on a latitude-longitude 
grid equally, thereby making our ideal point specification more appropriate than the 
ones employed in the studies mentioned above.   
 
Specifically, the choice process for consumer i involves selecting among h = 1,....,Hm 
hotel properties in market m =1,...,M. The indirect utility that consumer i derives from 
a room-night in hotel h in market m is given by    
 
                                       ( , )ihm hm hm hCBDm hAIRm hm ihmU p g d dγ α ξ ε= − + + +                     (1)   
 
where γhm is the property constant, α is the marginal utility of price; g(.)  is the 
transportation cost function; hmξ reflects factors that affect the consumer's utility from 
h in market m but are unobserved by the researcher, and εihm is a mean zero stochastic 
term. ξ's include numerous hotel characteristics like external appearance, residence 
services such as gym, laundry, shuttle service etc., temporary construction or blockade 
                                                 
20 We are limited by available data to these four attributes. It is possible that consumers have other ideal 
points.  For example, for one city it might be beach-front properties, for another it might be a 
technology park in a suburb; in fact, some cities might have several ideal points. Given these likely 
differences across cities, for any additional ideal point specification, trying to find a centroid to define 
as that ideal point (should it be the middle of the beach-front strip, or the edge of the technology park?) 
would be ad-hoc.  Therefore, we postulate that should these other ideal points exist, they are currently 
captured in the error term.  As explained later, the GEV error term distributional assumptions are 
general (unrestrictive) enough for this to not cause a problem. 
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of highway exits that lead to the property, resulting in reduced access, and hence 
utility to the consumer, and so forth.  Note that these property-specific factors in each 
market are unobservable to us in the data but observable to both the consumer and the 
firm. Therefore price p might be correlated with the unobserved factors that affect 
demand, causing econometric endogeneity of price. Choice of property location might 
also be affected by ξ, for example, proximity to highway exits and recreational 
facilities. Thus like price, correlation between unobserved factors and geographic 
location causes endogeneity in location choice.  In this respect, we depart from 
existing papers that assume location to be econometrically exogenous (e.g., Kamita 
2001, Davis 2002, and Thomadsen 2001). 
 
The transportation cost function g(.) depends on two variables - distance of property h 
from airport and from CBD in market m, denoted as dhAIRm and dhCBDm respectively.21 
Following Huff (1966) and Anderson and De Palma (1992) we specify a linear 
quadratic transportation cost function as below  
 
              2 21 2 3 4( , ) * * * *hCBDm hAIRmhCBDm hAIRm hCBDm hAIRmg d d d d d dφ φ φ φ= − + − +       (2)    
 
We postulate that the disutility from choosing a property increases at a diminishing 
rate in distance from the consumer's ideal point.  This concavity in consumer disutility 
is modeled as a quadratic transportation cost function, and ensures an internal solution 
(Anderson and dePalma, 1992). Combining equations (1) and (2) we get 
 
             
2 2
1 2 3 4ihm hm hm hCBDm hCBDm hAIRm hAIRm hm ihmU p d d d dγ α φ φ φ φ ξ ε= − − + − + + +     (3)  
                                                 
21 We do not impose a linear city structure.  Therefore, specifying the distance of any property from any 
one ideal point does not uniquely describe the location of any property.   
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This utility specification is a simple extension to single ideal point parameterizations, 
to accommodate multiple ideal points. In our case, airport and CBD are the ideal 
points. One should note that in several studies (Hauser and Shugan 1983; Hauser 
1988; Choi, DeSarbo and Harker, 1990, 1992), the consumers’ ideal point/points are 
endogenously determined in their proposed model.  In our study they are fixed and 
exogenous based on industry surveys mentioned previously.  
 
To complete the demand specification, we formulate the utility from the outside good 
as follows::   
                                                                  iomiomU ε=                                                    (4) 
Equation (3) implicitly assumes a set Ahm of consumers who select alternative h in 
market m, where Ahm is given by                                                     
                   },:),..,...,,,,,{( 4321 hlUUA ilmihmiHmihmmimimimiiomhm ≠∀≥= εεεεεεε          (5) 
Assuming ties occur with zero probability the market share of property h in market m 
can be expressed as                                                                
                                                                                                         (6)  
∫=
hmA
hm dPS )(* ε
where )(* εP  denotes population distribution function for the stochastic demand 
shock ε .  
Next we discuss the homogenous GNL model followed by the heterogeneous GNL 
model.  GNL is consistent with a utility maximizing decision theoretic approach under 
some conditions as described in the next section.  
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Model I: Homogenous Generalized Nested Logit Demand Model 
The GNL is a GEV model derived from the p.d.f for      
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  where Nn is the set of all alternatives included in nest n, ahn  is the allocation 
parameter which characterizes the portion of alternative h assigned to nest n. If 
allocation parameter is zero or econometrically insignificant for any alternative in any 
nest, it signifies that the alternative does not belong in that nest. A value of one 
indicates that this alternative is not fractionally allocated but rather only belongs in a 
single nest. The share in nest n of alternative h in market and share of nest n in market 
m are given by the expressions below 
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hna must satisfy the condition that 1 hhn
n
a = ∀∑ 22.  µn
0
 is the logsum parameter that 
captures the dissimilarity between alternatives in nest n. The GNL model is consistent 
with random utility maximization if the condition 1nµ≤ ≤ (for all n) is satisfied.  A 
high value for this parameter means alternatives in a nest are dissimilar, and low value 
means alternatives in the nest are similar. 
 
The cross price effect of share of alternative h with respect to price of alternative k is 
given by  
                                            
( )| |*1 nm hn nm kn nmn
hm km
n n km
S S S
S S
S
µ αµ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪− +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑               (11)                         
 Note that the elasticity expression is a function of nest logsum parameter and 
allocation parameters (via shares). When the logsums are all set to be equal to 1, the 
above equation simplifies to the cross-elasticity expression for multinomial logit. 
Under the restriction that alternatives belong to only one nest and the allocation 
parameters sum to 1, the above expression simplifies to the cross-elasticity expression 
for nested logit.  
 
Therefore, once we estimate the nest allocations we can get a better understanding of 
the consumers’ decision process. Furthermore, given nest overlap, at the 
aggregate/industry level we can examine how each alternative is positioned relative to 
others in each nest.  
 
                                                 
22 Note, the allocation parameters of alternatives across nests do not have any explicit structural 
interpretation. They are best viewed as the population level likelihood or probability of the alternative 
in a nest.   
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Full Model – Generalized Nested Logit With Consumer Heterogeneity (or mixed 
GNL) 
In practice consumers might differ in their preference for price and location. We 
therefore extend the homogenous GNL model by introducing consumer specific taste 
parameters. Berry et al. (1994) demonstrate the advantages of incorporating consumer 
heterogeneity using a random coefficients approach; their application is to the logit 
model of consumer choices. Following them, we also incorporate consumer 
heterogeneity via random coefficients or individual-specific taste parameters in the 
consumer utility specification. This is done despite using aggregate data. The extant 
literature in this area employs both continuous parametric distribution and discrete 
support for the random coefficients distribution. We use a continuous support random 
coefficients demand model, and draw the consumer specific taste parameters from an 
empirical distribution (Nevo 2001). We chose the continuous support approach over 
the latent class/discrete support approach to reduce the number of estimated 
parameters23  
 
Re-specifying the utility function as a function of individual taste parameters, we have 
 
                               2 21 2 3 4
i i i i i i
ihm j hm hCBDm hCBDm hAIRm hAIRm hm ihmU p d d d dγ α φ φ φ φ ξ= − − + − + + +ε
i
     (12) 
 
where 1 2 3 4, , , ,  and 
i i i i i
jγ α φ φ φ φ  are individual specific taste coefficients. The ξ 's and ε’s 
are as discussed previously. 
 
                                                 
23 Additionally, there might be some segment identification problems using aggregate data as 
demonstrated in Bodapati and Gupta (2004). 
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Assuming continuous support for consumer heterogeneity, we integrate the individual 
level choice probabilities (in the homogenous case this is equivalent to market share 
expressions) in Model 1, over its continuous support. However, unlike Nevo (2000), 
consumers in our industry are transient to the local market, and therefore we cannot 
use the local demographics’ distribution to model consumer heterogeneity. Instead, 
like Besanko et. al. (2003), we rely on draws from a parametric distribution.  Since we 
do not observe individual level choices, we simulate individual choice probabilities by 
drawing the individual taste heterogeneity parameters as follows 
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where 1, , 4γ α φ φ−  are the population level mean preference parameters and nµ  is the 
vector of population level mean error parameters 
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Respecifying the utility function as a function of population mean and individual taste 
variation parameters, we have 
 2 2
1 2 3 4i i i i i iihm hm hm hCBDm hCBDm hAIRm hAIRm ihm
U V p d d d dγ α φ φ φ φς ς ς ς ς ς= + − − + − + +ε         (15) 
where         2 21 2 3 4hm hm hCBDm hCBDm hAIRm hAIRm hmV p d d d dγ α φ φ φ φ ξ= − − + − + +                     (16) 
Thus the individual choice probability expressions are given below:  
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The conditional choice probability (alternative choice probability conditional on nest 
choice) and probability of nest choice respectively are given by the expressions below  
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Summing over all simulated individuals i in market m we obtain the simulated market 
share expression for alternative h in market m as given below 
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where smN is the number of simulated individuals for market m.  The corresponding 
share in nest and nest share expressions are as follows 
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To summarize, equation (20) represents the system of estimation equations for the 
demand side.  That is, we will estimate a GNL-based market share model using 
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aggregate data.  We simulate individual level choices using the GNL demand 
specification, and these individual level choices are aggregated to generate predictions 
for market share.   We account for individual heterogeneity in two separate ways in 
equation (13):  (1) preference heterogeneity via the parameters 1, , 4γ α φ φ− . This 
captures heterogeneity in consumer preference for attributes (2) we also allow for 
heterogeneity among consumers in their evaluation of the similarity among 
alternatives in a nest.  That is, we allow for error  heterogeneity ( Swait and 
Bernardino (2000), Kamakura et al. (1996) ) in the each of the n logsum parameters 
µn. Error heterogeneity enables more flexible patterns in competition between 
alternatives. Our specification allows for two sources of differential correlation 
between alternatives belonging to different nests – allocation parameters and 
consumer varying log-sum parameter. 24
 
2.3. Modeling cost 
We assume that the (annual, given frequency of data) marginal cost per room for 
property h is a function of property-specific cost shifters and a random cost shock. In 
order to account for location specific cost effects, we specify the marginal cost 
function as 
                   (23) 
2
1 2 1 2
2
3 4
* * * * * *
* *
hm h h hm h hm hCBDm hCBDm
hAIRm hAIRm hm
mc I elect I serv d d
d d
ω κ κ ρ ρ
ρ ρ υ
= + + + +
+ + +
where hϖ  is the property-specific mean component of the marginal cost, hI  is a 
property-specific dummy and hmν  a mean zero stochastic shock.  We include two 
exogenous marginal costs drivers - electricity costs and service costs. These are price 
                                                 
24 Consumer choice/decision rule heterogeneity is another possible source of consumer heterogeneity 
(see Swait and Bernardino (2000)). While Kamakura et al. (1996) account for taste and structural 
heterogeneity, we do not in this paper.  Rather, like Swait and Bernardino (2000), we account for taste 
and error heterogeneity. 
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indices that capture the costs of electricity usage and labor/service costs like cleaners, 
security personnel etc.  Note that in the estimation the intercept and the exogenous 
marginal cost drivers are estimated at the brand level, i.e., all properties of a particular 
brand have the same parameter.  In other words, we model marginal costs that vary by 
brand.  For example higher priced brand might have higher service and utility costs 
for their properties. 
 
In addition to the above components of marginal cost, we also include a location-
based component of marginal cost.  This specification allows distance of a property 
from market foci to affect its marginal costs. Like the transportation costs in the 
consumer utility specification, here too we specify a quadratic cost function to allow 
for non-linear effects as firms move away from ideal points. Costs can be related to 
distance from ideal points for a number of reasons.  For example, hotels might need to 
offer additional services like shuttle service to downtown and airport, luggage check-
in, additional dining alternatives etc. to attract location-sensitive consumers.  These 
additional service offerings increase marginal costs for the property.  It is also 
possible, and even likely, that consumer ideal points attract a cluster of competitors, 
and hence creates a common labor market or lower delivery costs for suppliers 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Baum and Haveman, 1997).   
 
The stochastic marginal cost error term captures cost shocks (e.g. due to travel shuttle 
service costs, refurnishing, new on-site features) that are unobserved to the 
econometrician but known to the firm. We assume that hmν   is independent of ihmε .  
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2.4 Modeling competition 
We model pricing decisions of firms in this differentiated market, taking as given the 
locations of their hotel properties.   Of course, location was chosen strategically by 
each of these properties when they entered the market. However, as our time-series 
data has only three instances of entry, we are unable to estimate a model of entry and 
endogenous location.  Therefore, for any given property, the location is taken to be 
exogenous for the data period.  As we have argued in the section 2.1 above, location is 
econometrically endogenous, even if it is strategically exogenous, so we will still have 
to control for this endogeneity in the estimation of demand and supply.  Price, on the 
other hand, is strategically endogenous.  That is, firms choose prices taking into 
account their competitors’ choice of actions.  We model this interaction as a Bertrand-
Nash game. 
 
In the data, firms have multiple properties in each market.  Therefore, the pricing and 
location decisions of firms are modeled as the outcome of maximization of product 
line profits by hotel firms. Suppose there exist F firms in each market, each managing 
some Nfm of the, Hm  properties. Hfm is a set of properties owned or managed by firm f 
in market m. Since the available data are annual, we make the assumption of annual 
decisions of price25.  
 
The product line profit function for firm f in market m over all its properties h is given 
by                                                             
                                              
( )fm hm hm hm m
h
p mc Mπ
∈
= −∑
fmH
S
                                      (24)        
                                                 
25 Although we see practically no exits or entries, we do see some ownership changes in properties, 
which acts as another source of location variation within a market over the years observed.  Of course, 
there are variations in locations across markets.  
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where hmS = share of property h in market m, Mm is the size of market m. mchm  is the 
constant marginal costs of production/operation of property h. Note, the market size 
includes the outside good. 
Differentiating the profit function with respect to price, we obtain price first-order 
conditions as follows: 
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where Hfm is the set of properties belonging to firm f in market m. This yields the 
following expression for property h in market m 
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where the second term in the equation is the markup for property h in market m, and 
α  is the price response parameter.  Using standard empirical IO assumptions, 
marginal costs are not observed. We rely on obtaining consistent estimates of the 
demand system and on the equilibrium assumption to compute the marginal costs 
implied by (23). Like Newey and McFadden (1994) we estimate the model in two 
stages -- demand model in stage one and supply model in the second stage. The 
advantages of this approach are three-fold. First, because equilibrium is not enforced 
in the demand estimation procedures, consistency of demand parameter estimates is 
independent of the particular equilibrium assumptions made and is therefore robust to 
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a wide set of possible assumptions. Second, there is no need to solve the equilibrium 
pricing problem during demand model estimation, thereby greatly reduces the 
computational burden of the estimation procedures involved with estimating the 
proposed non-linear demand model. The disadvantage of the approach is that greater 
efficiency could be obtained in the estimates by enforcing equilibrium during 
estimation26. Third, the two-stage estimation procedure employed here does not 
require us to posit any distributional assumption on ξ in the consumer utility 
specification, as done in Villas-Boas and Zhao (2003) study where the demand and 
supply side are jointly estimated. 
 
3. Data 
The model is applied to the Texas lodging industry. The Texas State Comptroller 
requires every lodging property to report taxable and non-taxable revenues on a 
quarterly basis. Source Strategies Incorporated (SSI), an independent marketing 
research firm located in San Antonio, aggregates and augments this (public) 
information in their annual reports entitled Texas Hotel Performance Factbook. We 
use data on all lodging properties (i.e., hotels, motels, bed-and-breakfasts) in Texas 
with annual revenues over 13,000 dollars (these properties have to report information 
to the State Comptroller) from 1991 through 1997. 
 
Hotel brands are categorized into sectors (Full-Service, Limited-Service or Extended 
Stay) and segments (Deluxe, Luxury, Upscale, and Midscale with Food and Beverage, 
Midscale without Food and Beverage, Economy, Budget, Upper-tier Extended Stay 
and Lower-tier Extended Stay).  In this study, we focus on full-service sector hotels.  
                                                 
26 In a joint estimation framework, the supply side equations involve implicit functions and 
computation of the Jacobian, adding more complexity to the estimation procedure. 
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Full service sector hotels are “usually high-rise establishments, offering a full range of 
on-premises food and beverage service, cocktail lounge, entertainment, conference 
facilities, shops and recreational activities. Wide range of services provided by 
uniformed staff on duty 24 hours. Parking arrangements vary.” 27  We limit our 
analysis to the full service sector for two reasons. One, there are numerous entries and 
exits in other industry segments, which are outside the scope of this essay.  Second, 
there are no franchised properties in this segment of hotels.  Therefore the profit 
maximization assumption is robust to any agency issues.  Interestingly, we also find 
that airport and CBD properties are predominantly full-service.  
 
We used data from seven of the large cities in Texas, namely Austin, Dallas, Houston, 
Galveston, Midland, San Antonio, and Waco.  We chose these cities for two reasons: 
a) their large size and b) presence of the focal brands in these cities in all years 
observed in our data.  We define a market as a city-year combination, which results in 
7 cities* 7 years = 49 markets.  There were 18 properties in the data that exited the 
market after the data were collected in 1997, hence we could not obtain location 
information for these observations. Since the number and market share of these 
properties were not large enough to alter the results substantially, we dropped these 
properties from the estimation sample. In order to account for vertical and horizontal 
differentiation within the estimation sample we selected eight brands that represent the 
three major sub-categories namely Luxury (Hyatt, Marriott, Sheraton), Upscale 
(Hilton, Courtyard) and Midscale (Ramada Inn, Howard Johnson, Holiday Inn) of the 
full service category. The final sample consists of 1024 observations that account for 
87% of total full-service property shares. 
 
                                                 
27 Quoted from the AAA. “New York TourBook”. Buffalo, NY: AAA Publishing. 1999. 
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In addition to information on property name, capacity, and revenue, SSI's Factbooks 
contain information on each property's average daily rates (ADR), brand affiliation 
and the number of days the property is open throughout the year. ADR is estimated 
from surveys conducted by SSI, financial reports, information from appraisers, chain 
and AAA directories, and information provided by Smith Travel Resource. The ADR 
is the pre-sales tax price28. The data required to estimate the model include market 
shares, prices, brand characteristics, and distribution of population characteristics. 
Therefore, we augment the property level data with city-county level information 
including the indices for electric utilities and construction; these last two data series 
are to be used as marginal cost drivers29.   
 
For each property we also collect location information via Mapquest.com.  Given the 
street address of a property, we obtained the driving distance in miles and driving time 
in minutes from two fixed loci - the airport, and the CBD. The correlations between 
distance and time measures were 0.83 and 0.91 for CBD and airport respectively. 
Hence we use distance rather than driving time measures to estimate the models. 
 
Some additional issues arise in the implementation of the model to the data.  First, in 
the context of hotel demand, it is not obvious what no-purchase means.  For example, 
it could be consumers who visit the town but do not stay in a lodging facility, but data 
for this measure is hard to obtain. Moreover, there are multiple ways of translating 
number of visitors to hotel room demand (e.g., does each visitor translate to one room 
or double occupancy?) Therefore in this study we treat the no-purchase option to be 
                                                 
28 Like Sudhir (2001) and Berry et al. (1995), our price measure is the average/aggregate price offered 
to consumers in a particular market.   
29 We cannot use these cost instruments in demand formulation, given demand is from non-local 
consumers. 
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the purchase of a non-focal brand property in the full-service sector. Total market size 
is defined as the sum of the outside and inside goods for a city-year market. Second, 
given we have only seven annual observations per property, allocation parameters are 
estimated at brand level rather than property-level to conserve degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics of the final estimation sample. Note that there 
is significant variation in location and price in a market.  To determine if the hotels 
can simply be classified as CBD or AIR type, we divided the sample into two 
sub-samples, one consists of properties closer to CBD than to the airport, and the 
other consists of properties that are closer to airport than CBD. Table 2.2 contains 
descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples. The data indicate that there is significant 
variation in both location and price within each sub-group.  Similarly, we group all the 
properties into low and high prices based on a median-split, and Table 2.3 contains 
these descriptive statistics.   As is obvious from tables 2.2 and 2.3, a simple price and 
location split still leaves a lot of heterogeneity in samples.  This provides prima facie 
support for using the GNL demand model.  Finally, table 2.4 shows brand-level 
variance in prices and average distances to indicate that brands clearly price 
differently depending on demand and competitive conditions in markets; our essay 
attempts to capture these demand and competition drivers.   
 
Table 2.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Deviation 
Market Share 0.050 0.043 
Price per room night (in US dollars) 74.14 21.49 
Distance to CBD (in miles) 7.56 5.94 
Distance to Airport (in miles) 7.89 6.43 
Room nights sold (in a year) 86703 21004 
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Table 2.2 -  Descriptive statistics by price range 
 
 High price hotels Low price hotels 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev
Market Share 0.071 0.022 0.024 0.016 
Price per room night (in US 
dollars) 
79.04 12.56 64.56 9.75 
Distance to CBD (in miles) 7.42 5.45 5.33 4.34 
Distance to Airport (in miles) 6.84 6.47 6.01 3.22 
Room nights sold (in a year) 61022 11087 50034 12091 
 
Table 2.3 -  Descriptive statistics by distance 
 
 Hotels closer to CBD Hotels closer to AIR 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev
Market Share 0.047 0.043 0.067 0.069 
Price per room night (in US 
dollars) 
64.474 24.597 78.316 23.093 
Distance to CBD (in miles) 3.546 3.039 12.226 6.535 
Distance to Airport (in miles) 7.61 8.533 3.632 2.704 
Room nights sold (in a year) 72360.52 15180.19 71258.93 35725.3 
 
Table 2.4 -  Descriptive statistics by brand 
 
Brands Distance to CBD Distance to AIR Price in dollars 
Courtyard 5.715 5.253 80.88 
Hilton 8.116 8.823 74.82 
Hojo 6.906 4.566 45.78 
HolidayInn 4.571 4.926 65.45 
Hyatt 7.076 3.366 98.46 
Marriott 9.922 3.658 95.14 
Ramada 2.000 9.693 47.84 
Sheraton 9.100 8.007 78.60 
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4. Results  
4.1 Estimation Procedure 
We estimate the parameters of the aggregate demand function, explicitly accounting 
for endogeneity in price and location.  This is achieved by employing the contraction 
mapping procedure of Berry (1994). Among other things, the contraction mapping 
procedure facilitates use of linear instrumenting techniques to correct for endogeneity.  
We then estimate the supply side first-order optimization rules for price.  We briefly 
outline the procedure used for estimation. The estimation equates the observed shares 
to the predicted shares from our model. Note, however an observation is the simulated 
choice probabilities of an individual for a market (city-year combination). Since the 
number of properties (consideration set) changes per market, the vector of choice 
probabilities vary per city.  The market shares for each property are obtained by 
averaging the individual choice probabilities across the simulated individuals for that 
market. It is these market shares probabilities that serve as the predicted shares for the 
estimation procedure. 
Due to the endogeneity in price and location we implement a procedure similar to 
Berry (1994) using two nested loops. The inner loop involves computing the 
individual-invariant parameters of the model, while the outer loop involves computing 
the individual specific parameters.  The actual steps of the estimation are as follows: 
 
Stage 1: Keeping the outer loop parameters fixed (obtained from initial guess), we 
estimate the inner loop (individual invariant parameters) by minimizing the distance 
between the predicted shares Shm from the model and observed shares using a non-
linear optimization procedure. This step yields estimates for the population level mean 
utilities for each property as intercepts hmV where hmV  is as below  
                         2 21 2 3 4hm j hm hCBDm hCBDm hAIRm hAIRm hmV p d d d dγ α φ φ φ φ ξ− − + − + +=   
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As motivated in section 2, both price and location measures can be correlated with ξ  
making the OLS estimator inconsistent for estimating the population level mean 
parameters 1, , 4γ α φ φ− .  Note however that the recovered hmV is linear function of 
observed and unobserved product attribute ( hmξ ).  Therefore we use linear instruments 
based 2SLS estimator to obtain unbiased estimates of 1, , 4γ α φ φ− .        
 
Stage 2: The market specific ξ's are obtained as residuals of the 2SLS regression from  
Stage 1.  
 
Stage 3: The error term ξ is then interacted with the instruments used in the Stage 1 to 
provide the GMM objective function, which is then used for estimating the outer loop 
(individual specific) parameters. 
 
Stage 4: Iterated over different values for heterogeneity parameters till the GMM 
objective function from Stage 3 in maximized and the convergence criterion is met30. 
Stage 5: As a test of robustness, we repeat Step 1 though Step 5 for different starting 
values drawn from a Halton sequence31. 
 
                                                 
30 A detailed description of the estimation procedure can be obtained from the authors. A Maximum 
Likelihood procedure was also implemented. It relied on a normality assumption on the distribution of 
the ξ, unlike the GMM procedure. Only the GMM results are presented in the paper. MLE results can 
be obtained from authors. Our GMM based estimation algorithm is akin to Chintagunta (2001) wherein 
another non-linear demand model i.e. aggregate Probit is estimated.  
 
31 Like Nevo (2000) we use draws from a multivariate normal distribution to simulate individual’s 
preference for attributes. One limitation of this approach as pointed out by Kim et al. (1995) and 
Brownstone and Train (2002) is that it allows for both positive and negative individual coefficients for 
price and location. They suggest draws from an alternative distribution within a restricted range 
(truncated normal distribution). 
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We need instrumental variables for the endogenous price and location variables. Like 
Nevo (2000), controlling for brand specific means, we assume that market specific 
valuations are independent. We select variables in other markets as instruments for 
price and location in focal market. We use the following variables as instruments: 
average annual gas price indices in the focal market; distance from airport and CBD in 
other markets; annual prices in all other markets. The intuition being that while prices 
and location might be correlated across markets, the demand shocks are uncorrelated 
across markets 32. That is, if is a vector of parameters of the model then                                                 θ
                                                .( , )
obs
hm m hmξ =S Sθ
where 
obs
hmS  is the observed market share. Since the demand model is non-linear, as a 
test of robustness we check whether the estimation procedure converges to the same 
point with different starting values.  
 
Given the high dimensionality of the parameter space, starting values generated by 
traditional random sequence generators may have certain limitations (Bhat, 1999; 
Revelt and Train, 2000). Instead we generate a Halton sequence of draws for starting 
values. Unlike traditional robustness testing methods where the objective is true 
randomness to ensure that the same convergence point is reached regardless of 
starting point, in high dimension search spaces, true randomness might not achieve the 
objective of efficient and thorough search of the parameter space. The Halton 
sequence procedure is an alternative process for efficient coverage of the parameter 
space in such situations. Numerical analyses have found that a smaller number of 
                                                 
32 Bronnenberg and Mahajan (2001) find strong support for spatial dependence between markets that 
are ``close". In order to rule out such dependence, we regressed demand shock, from Stage 2 for an 
alternative, on its own demand shock from other markets. The coefficients on other market demand 
shocks were statistically insignificant, lending more validity to our choice of instruments.   This is not 
surprising given our seven markets are non-neighboring cities in Texas. 
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Halton draws is as effective as a larger number of pseudo-random draws using a 
random number generator (Revelt and Train, 2000). 
 
Exogenous cost indices for electrical utilities and services were obtained only at the 
market level.  We model the effects of these cost drivers as being at the brand-level 
rather than property level, given the received wisdom in the industry that higher price 
brands are likely to have variable operating costs.   
 
Since the market shares sum to one, the error terms in the demand equations are 
correlated. This makes seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) a better estimator than 
OLS. We use the Hausman (1978) test to test for endogeneity of price and location. 
Under the null hypothesis that price and location are exogenous, the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) estimator provides consistent estimates of the demand 
parameters. On the other hand, 2SLS provides consistent estimates both under the null 
and alternate hypotheses (Amemiya, 1985). The Hausman test, which basically 
compares the estimates of SUR and 2SLS estimators, leads to rejection of the null 
hypothesis (p<.01) that prices or location are exogenous.33 The final step involves 
estimating the first order conditions for price given by equations (27). 
 
4.2  Results 
While several competing models were estimated results for homogenous MNL, mixed 
MNL, homogenous GNL and mixed GNL are only presented in Table 2.5.  We report 
                                                 
33 Results of OLS, SUR and 2SLS procedures can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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results for mixed logit as a benchmark given its widespread usage in marketing and 
economics.34  
 
As Table 2.5 indicates, based on sum of squares errors alone mixed GNL outperforms 
the other two models. Apart from within-sample SSE criteria, the Full Model i.e. 
Mixed GNL was chosen over other competing demand models (Mixed Logit, Mixed 
NL) using both the Cox criteria and Encompassing Test criteria for non-nested 
competing models using GMM as proposed in Smith (1992) 35. Interested readers can 
refer to Smith (1992) for a more detailed explanation of the model selection criteria.  
 
These non-nested test criteria evaluate how the alternative models explain the residual 
unobserved determinants of market share of a chosen null model. The two tests 
proposed in Smith (1992) are generalizations of Singleton (1985) allowing for non-
nested tests for competing regression models estimated using instrumental variables 
and GMM estimation. Results for exogenous location and price for MNL, Mixed 
Logit and Mixed GNL can be obtained from the author. We observe a downward bias 
due to endogeneity in the location parameters, consistent with the findings of Besanko 
et al. (1998), and Besanko et al. (2003) for price endogeneity. 
 
Not only is the Full Model chosen based on the two non-nested model selection 
criteria, but also the estimated mean price and mean location parameters for mixed 
GNL and mixed logit are statistically significantly different from one another.  
                                                 
34 Similar comparisons have been made between mixed probit and mixed logit using a) panel data 
(Chintagunta and Honore, 1996) and b) aggregate data (Chintagunta, 2001). This is an important 
contribution of this paper, since the resulting aggregate elasticities affect market power. 
35 If H0: E0[Full Model]=0 and Halt: E1[Non-Nested Variant Model]=0 are the two competing 
hypothesis then the form of the Cox statistic is that of a GMM specification test (Newey, 
1985) and is amenable to local power analysis. Similarly the form of the Encompassing test statistic 
 has a limiting chi-squared distribution.   
( | )t o altH H 
( | )E t o altH H£
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Benchmarking our demand specification i.e. aggregate mixed GNL with the 
commonly used aggregate mixed logit using aggregate data, is an important 
contribution of this essay, since the resulting aggregate elasticities affect market 
power.  As our results indicate, misspecification of mixed MNL as the appropriate 
demand specification for our industry and data would yield an inaccurate picture of 
market power. The heterogeneous logit and GNL results indicate statistically 
significant variation in tastes for price and location within the market. The signs and 
relative magnitudes of the location specific coefficients indicate greater preference for 
proximity to CBD. The signs of the 3φ and 4φ suggest increasing utility as a property 
moves further away from AIR.  
  
Note that this does not imply that there is only one ideal point i.e., CBD.  Our results 
indicate 2 ideal points, albeit having very different considerations.  The results could 
be driven by underlying unaccounted segmentation in the market where some 
consumers have a high preference for properties closer to downtown and away from 
airport, while another small segment prefers to be closer to airport.  The latter segment 
could be a small captive segment comprising of customers like airline crew, transit 
passengers who prefer to be closer to airport without much consideration for distance 
of property from downtown. What we see in our results is the net effect of the two 
segments36.  Our intuition is consistent with the data where we see a lot more 
clustering happening around CBD than airport (685 properties vs. 339 properties).   
On average consumers are willing to pay $1.44 to be one mile closer to the central 
business district, and $1.22 to be one mile away from the airport. 
                                                 
36 Hence there could be a segment that actually prefers to be closer to airport despite signs on 
coefficients 3φ and 4φ . 
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Table 2.5 - Estimates of  demand parameters 
Parameter Homogenous GNL Mixed logit Heterogeneous GNL 
Courtyard brand constant -1.980*  -1.860* -1.257* 
Hilton brand constant -0.453* -0.912* -0.671* 
Hojo brand constant 0.613 0.630* 0.511 
Holiday Inn brand constant -1.486* -0.148 -0.152* 
Hyatt brand constant -1.521* -1.631* -1.465* 
Marriott brand constant 2.650 1.836* 1.742* 
Ramada brand constant 1.880* 2.735* 2.370* 
Sheraton brand constant -2.201* -0.123 -1.350* 
Price : -α 4.630* 3.148* 3.211* 
Dist. To CBD : -φ1 1.689* 4.353* 4.614* 
Dist. To CBD2 : -φ2 0.192* 0.591* 0.435* 
Dist. To Airport :-φ3 -1.835* -3.610* -3.906* 
Dist. To Airport2: -φ4 -0.116* -0.192* -0.129** 
Variance in  α :  σα . 0.841* 0.062* 
Variance in φ1 : σφ1 . 0.623* 0.612* 
Variance in φ2 : σφ2 . 0.429* 0.456* 
Variance in φ3 : σφ3 . 0.906 0.751 
Variance in φ4 : σφ4 . 0.441* 0.394* 
Courtyand in Nest 1 0.243*  0.287* 
Hilton in Nest 1 0.259*  0.164* 
Hojo in Nest 1 0.118**  0.101 
Holiday Inn in Nest 1 0.312*  0.223 
Hyatt in Nest 1 0.221*  0.147 
Marriott in Nest 1 0.334  0.345** 
Ramada in Nest 1 0.367  0.289** 
Sheraton in Nest 1 0.243  0.248* 
Courtyand in Nest 2 0.292*  0.384* 
Hilton in Nest 2 0.516*  0.552* 
Hojo in Nest 2 0.192*  0.281* 
Holiday Inn in Nest 2 0.558*  0.603* 
Hyatt in Nest 2 0.513*  0.671* 
Marriott in Nest 2 0.302  0.243 
Ramada in Nest 2 0.161*  0.199* 
Sheraton in Nest 2 0.261*  0.209* 
Logsum nest 1: µ1 0.071*  0.118* 
Logsum nest 2: µ2 0.303*  0.443* 
Logsum nest 3: µ3 0.248*  0.313* 
Variance in µ1   .04* 
Variance in µ2   .141* 
Variance in µ3   .095* 
Minimized SSE 95.43 99.26 83.43 
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Consider next the parameters associated with the heterogeneity distribution.  A 
closer examination of the heterogeneity estimates ( ' sσ ) for price and location 
suggests that mixed logit on average overestimates heterogeneity compared to 
heterogeneous GNL (3 of 5 estimated heterogeneity parameters are much higher for 
the mixed logit and statistically significant, the other 2 differences in heterogeneity 
are smaller and not statistically significant). A possible interpretation of this is as 
follows: what mixed logit classifies as consumer heterogeneity is made of two parts- 
lower consumer heterogeneity versus higher heterogeneity of purpose of visit and 
hence different choices for the same consumer.  An individual-level demand model 
would be able to separate these two effects out, but at the aggregate level, mixed 
logit is unable to, and mixed GNL begins to address the issues.  Despite GNL’s 
flexibility, accounting for heterogeneity does increase model fit. The statistically 
significant heterogeneity estimates for the log-sum parameters provides evidence of 
error heterogeneity. Failure to account for this as in the case of the heterogeneous 
logit, results in biasing the taste heterogeneity parameters.  
 
We exogenously specify three nests for both homogenous GNL and mixed GNL37.   
The nest memberships will indicate if nests are driven solely by proximity to ideal 
points or price alone or by a composite measure of price, location, brand and other 
omitted product attributes. We treat this composite to capture overall quality of the 
property (or the overall utility).   Let us first examine if nest membership is driven 
by price alone.  Note that in nest 2, the brands with the highest allocation parameters 
are Hilton (0.55), Holiday Inn (0.60) and Hyatt (0.67).   In the full-service sector of 
hotels, Holiday Inn is classified as a midscale brand, Hilton as upscale and Hyatt as 
                                                 
37 That is, we have 3 nests for purchase, and one for the outside good.  Data constraints prevent a 
larger number of nests.  We report only the 3-nest results; these are statistically superior to the 2-nest 
results. The search for appropriate nesting structure was conducted over four possible structures – 1) 
based on industry classification 2) price alone 3) location alone and 4) all alternatives in each nest. 
We report results for the case 4) where each alternative is available in both nests. 
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upscale.  Therefore, it does not appear as if nest 2 membership composition is based 
on price alone.  Similar observations can be made for nests 1 and 3.   
 
Next, we examine if nest membership is based on location alone.  To do this, we 
calculate the average distance from AIR and CBD for each of the 3 estimated nests.  
These numbers are reported in Table 2.6.  It appears from these numbers that if we 
were to classify the nests based on distance alone, nest 1 would correspond to AIR, 
nest 2 to CBD and nest 3 “other”, possibly a suburban nest corresponding to an 
office complex, or tourist destination (e.g., beach), etc. Next, we report the 
estimated nest shares for the 3 nests.  Finally, from the data, we calculate how many 
properties actually fall within a circle of radius equal to average distance from AIR 
and CBD foci.   
Table 2.6 - Estimated nest shares of properties 
 
 Average 
price 
Average distance 
to CBD 
Average distance to 
AIR 
% Market Share 
Nest1 16.840 7.039 2.082 11.73 
Nest2 23.827 2.439 7.718 69.99 
Nest3 21.224 4.806 6.982 18.28 
 
Market share of properties as a function of distance from foci 
 
Distance from CBD Distance from AIR 
2.5 miles- 40.03% 2 miles = 14.8% 
3 miles = 44.9% 4 miles = 15.4% 
5 miles = 56.6% 5 miles = 18.9% 
 
Comparing the last two sets of numbers, we find that the nest 1 (AIR) has lower 
estimated membership (11.73%) than properties located physically close to AIR 
(14.8%), and nest 2 (CBD) has higher estimated membership (69.99%) than 
properties physically located close to CBD (40.03%).  This means that properties 
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can be further away from downtown (than the average distance in this nest) and still 
be considered in the CBD choice set by consumers, possibly because they offer 
lower price or some other unobserved attributes.38 Similarly, properties that are 
located physically close to AIR serve demand not directly related to the AIR 
choices, likely because they compete effectively with properties in nest 3 by 
offering lower price or some other unobserved attribute like better facilities or 
transportation etc. Summarizing, while nests are broadly distance based (AIR, CBD 
and other), the substitution patterns are more complex than simply distance based.  
In other words, a firm’s competitive set is determined not by proximity or quality 
tiers alone, but by a combination of the two, and other unobserved attributes.  
 
Consider next the estimated logsum parameters.  The logsum of the nest with 
outside good is set to be 1 for identification purposes. These structural nest 
parameters or logsums are significantly different from one another, suggesting 
violation of IIA property in the data. They also lie between 0 and 1 and are hence 
consistent with random utility maximization.  Nest 2 or the CBD nest has the 
highest logsum parameter (0.443) or has the most dissimilar properties of the three 
nests, nest 1 has the most homogenous membership (0.118).  This is not surprising 
in light of our previous discussion of properties not near CBD being considered as 
part of the CBD nest.   
 
As discussed in the model section, own and cross-price elasticities in GNL are 
functions of both the allocation and log-sum parameters.   Table 2.7 reports these 
elasticities for various brands. 
                                                 
38 Recall that consumers have positive utility to being close to CBD.  Hence, if a property is located 
farther away from CBD, it would have to drop price to effectively compete with CBD hotels. 
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Table 2.7 - Estimated price elasticities 
Change in Market Shares 
Change in 
Price 
Lower priced/ 
"Midscale" 
Medium priced/ 
"Upscale" 
High priced/ 
"Luxury" 
 Hojo Holiday 
Inn 
Ramada Courtyard Hilton Hyatt Marriott Sheraton
Hojo -2.938 0.375 0.317 0.111 0.093 0.078 0.302 0.071 
Holiday 
Inn 
0.278 -4.333 0.155 0.305 0.087 0.112 0.255 0.048 
Ramada 0.332 0.212 -1.288 0.440 0.432 0.239 0.223 0.255 
Courtyard 0.162 0.246 0.447 -3.519 0.460 0.178 0.386 0.0322 
Hilton 0.122 0.108 0.410 0.328 -6.080 0.604 0.292 0.713 
Hyatt 0.054 0.094 0.390 0.211 0.657 -5.202 0.339 0.611 
Marriott 0.160 0.168 0.319 0.331 0.232 0.398 -3.452 0.665 
Sheraton 0.010 0.043 0.213 0.160 0.624 0.533 0.591 -3.221 
Examining own price elasticities, we find some interesting patterns.  The highest 
own-price elasticity is for Hilton (-6.08), which is a medium-priced brand, and the 
lowest own-price elasticity is for Sheraton, a high-priced brand.   So clearly price 
elasticities are not just functions of the price tiers of firms.   Looking at cross-price 
elasticities, Hilton-Sheraton has the largest cross elasticity while Sheraton-Hojo has 
the lowest cross elasticity. The price elasticity table reveals some counterintuitive 
results. Industry classification puts Hilton in the middle (upscale) price tier, and 
Sheraton is the high price luxury tier. One would expect price elasticities between 
hotels in the same tier to be higher than those across tiers. Counter to this belief, our 
results show that the price elasticity between Sheraton and Hilton (0.71) is higher 
than the elasticity between Sheraton and Marriott (0.66) or Sheraton and Hyatt 
(0.61) (the differences here are econometrically significant).  Note that these price 
elasticities control for location choices as well and hence are not comparable to 
industry classifications that are likely based on location-unadjusted pricing.  
 
Therefore, unlike industry classifications that assume that competition is mainly 
based on price (and hence the price-tier classification), in our data we see firms 
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competing in both price and geographic location. Let us now turn to the supply side 
estimates39.  Table 2.8 has the cost estimates. Marginal cost location parameters 
suggest that marginal cost increases at an increasing rate as a property moves further 
away from CBD. Therefore, CBD is an ideal point both  from demand and cost 
perspective. These costs of operating further away from CBD can be interpreted as 
Table 2.8: Estimates of supply-side parameters 
 
Parameters Estimates 
Courtyard brand intercept 0.457* 
Hilton brand intercept 1.439* 
Hojo  brand intercept 0.321* 
Holiday Inn brand intercept 0.416* 
Hyatt brand intercept 3.518* 
Marriott brand intercept 2.451 
Ramada Inn brand intercept 0.330 
Sheraton  brand intercept 2.615** 
Dist. to CBD ρ1 2.463* 
Dist. to CBD2  ρ2 0.063* 
Dist. to Airport ρ3 -2.175* 
Dist. to Airport2  ρ4 0.014 
Courtyard*elect.utils 2.338 
Hilton*elect.utils 2.348** 
Hojo*electr.utils 0.158** 
HolidayInn*elect.utils 1.761 
Hyatt*elec.utils 5.163* 
Marriott*electr.utils 3.090* 
Ramada*electr.utils 1.863 
Sheraton*electr.utils 2.269* 
Courtyard*services 2.869** 
Hilton*services 3.347* 
Hojo*services 0.668* 
HolidayInn*services 1.123 
Hyatt*services 6.774* 
Sheraton*services 3.587* 
Marriott*services 4.660** 
Ramada*services 1.817* 
 
                                                 
39 We present the supply side results only for the heterogenous GNL model. Interested readers can 
contact the authors for supply side results for MNL, Mixed MNL and NL models. 
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 the extra cost of competing with properties closer to CBD, and could include higher 
a variety of things e.g., having to offer shuttle services to downtown, offering other 
attractive features relative to CBD hotels, etc.  Given the clustering of properties 
near CBD, the result of costs increasing as a property moves away from CBD could 
also be interpreted as there being cost benefits to agglomeration near CBD.   For 
example, it might be easier for agglomerated properties to have shared shuttle 
services from CBD to the airport or tourist attractions, or cheaper for suppliers to 
drop off supplies to several agglomerated properties.  
 
Marginal cost increases at a decreasing rate as the property moves further away 
from AIR.  This can be explained in at least two ways:  first, if being closer to AIR 
is not attractive for a large segment of the population, then clearly being away from 
AIR means fewer costs have to be incurred to attract consumers (i.e., the reverse of 
the argument above for properties not close to CBD).   Second, again similar to the 
argument above, it is possible that costs of suppliers are lower for properties further 
away from AIR, or that city taxes (other than on prices which have been accounted 
for in the data) or other variables costs are higher near AIR.   
 
Several of the brand specific intercepts in the marginal cost function are statistically 
significant.  The parameters for the exogenous cost shifters take higher values for 
luxury brands than non-luxury brands.  The overall cost for a luxury brand is higher 
than for non-luxury brands, as reported in Table 2.9.  That is, the correlation 
between price and estimated marginal cost is very high (.90).   As an ex-post check 
of our marginal cost specification, we also calculated the correlation between 
estimated marginal costs and number of properties per brand per city. This 
correlation is very low (.001), ruling out economies of scope. The correlation 
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between capacity and marginal costs is .48, and capacity and prices is .53. This can 
be interpreted as market power of larger hotels. 
 
Table 2.9 - Brand-level supply side descriptors 
 
Brand Estimated 
marginal cost 
Dollar price Properties/market Capacity/property 
Courtyard 32.3 80.88 2.17 145 
Hilton 36.2 74.82 1.43 292 
Hojo 19.3 45.78 1.02 161 
HolidayInn 27.9 65.45 3.77 217 
Hyatt 42.2 98.46 1.83 369 
Marriott 38.3 95.14 2.5 430 
Sheraton 28.8 47.84 3.02 175 
Ramada 32.9 78.60 1.25 676 
 
To summarize our results from this exercise, our results indicate that location, like 
price, matters both on the demand and cost side.  We demonstrated the gains of 
GNL in explaining this market over the more commonly used mixed logit.  Note 
especially the lower heterogeneity estimates of GNL, possibly due to the more 
flexible substitution patterns allowed by the model (e.g., allowing for taste and error 
heterogeneity in choices of any given consumer reduces the estimate of 
heterogeneity across consumers).  The allocation parameters indicate that nest 
membership is not simply a function of price or location, but a combination of that 
and other unobserved factors. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this essay, we study the significance of price and geographic location as 
important  elements of a firm's product marketing mix.  In our industry and data 
context, choice heuristics are not obvious, and there is missing information on 
several attributes likely to matter to consumer choice.  Therefore, we argue that the 
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GNL is a good consumer choice model and its results will be a more accurate input 
in to determining firms’ competitive pricing choices.    
 
We find location attributes of retail properties affect both consumer demand and 
firm costs.  We also find strong evidence to support the role of location as a source 
of market power (through lower costs and through the ability to charge higher 
prices).  This essay thus provides a compelling argument for, and empirical 
validation of, the location-price link for differentiated oligopolies. Therefore, firms 
compete with not just their immediate same-price neighbors but also with lower-
price distant neighbors, and these location-adjusted price elasticities are equally 
important in determining with whom firms compete.  
 
The contributions of the essay are both methodological and substantive. 
Methodologically, we demonstrate for our industry and dataset, GNL based demand 
model that also accounts for taste and error heterogeneity, offers distinct benefits 
and statistical superiority over the popular mixed logit.  Its ability to accommodate 
flexible patterns of substitution between choices results in more accurate predictions 
of the price and location response parameters, and a more accurate picture of the 
competitive landscape. Substantively, we capture the competitive effects of a price 
and location choices.  Additionally, we account for the price-location links on both 
the demand (via multiple ideal points) and supply side (econometrically controlling 
for endogeneity of price and location, and costs of firms as a function of location).  
 
The methodology employed in this essay can be used to test for price-location 
interactions in other retail environments where price and location are strategic 
variables.  The flexibility of substitution patterns offered by GNL makes is a good 
alternative for situations in which nesting structures are not obvious and when 
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unobserved attributes might be especially important in these nesting structures.  An 
example of such an application is models of store-brand choices for studying retail 
competition, or for studying car choices where a number of alternative nesting 
structures are possible.  
 
To enrich our understanding of the consumer decision making in these situations, it 
would be useful to complement market-level data with individual-level choice data 
(Berry et al. (2004) and Chintagunta and Dube (2003)), unlike the present essay that 
relies only on aggregate data. Another extension would be to use the GNL 
framework to not just characterize the final choice but also the antecedent 
consideration set formation (Swait 2000).  We look forward to future work in this 
area.   
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 ESSAY 3 
DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF FIRM ENTRY, STAY 
AND EXIT DECISIONS 
Abstract 
This paper proposes an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of endogenous market 
entry, stay and exit decisions. In the lodging industry, decisions of entry and/or exit 
involve considerable irreversible investment in capital and uncertainty about 
demand, cost and competition. An inactive firm anticipating better market 
conditions in the future may differ entry to future periods and in the process risk 
forfeiting advantages from early entry to its competitors. An incumbent firm in 
anticipation of future entries or exits, can chose to either continue to stay or exit the 
market. Hence current and anticipated future market conditions can affect a lodging 
property’s market entry/exit timing decisions.  
 
Despite these long-run considerations, the extant literature predominately uses 
static/two period models and identifies factors like -- market uncertainty, excess 
capacity, firm heterogeneity and learning-by-doing -- to affect and in turn be 
affected by firm entry/exit decisions. Building on prior findings, this paper presents 
a unified empirical framework accounting for these effects in the context of discrete 
dynamic games, wherein the firm decisions i.e. entry, stay and exit are 
endogenously determined in Markov perfect equilibrium. Unlike previous static/two 
period models, firms in this paper are forward-looking, and maximize their profits 
over an infinite-time horizon. The optimality conditions are computed numerically  
using dynamic programming techniques and the model is calibrated using aggregate 
monthly panel data for the Texas lodging industry from 1991-2003. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the antecedents of market structure and the evolution of market 
structure are central issues in industrial organization. This literature can be broadly 
classified into descriptive and structural studies (Reiss and Wolak, 2002). 
Descriptive studies have a very rich history in economics and marketing for 
example Bresnahan and Reiss, (1990, 1991), Jacobson (1988), Jacobson and Aaker 
(1985) and Szymanski, Bharadwaj and Varadarajan (1993). A vast majority of these 
studies use the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm to provide valuable 
descriptive insights on the role of production efficiencies and marketing effort on 
firm/industry performance and market structure (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; 
Shaked and Sutton, 1983). Chandler (1990) and Lieberman and Montgomery 
(1998) address how these factors contribute to first-mover advantage and market 
structure.  
 
While these studies recognize patterns between economic variables in data, they do 
not specify an economic model that generates these variables (Kadiyali et al. 2001). 
Variables like price, costs, concentration that are outcomes of supply and demand 
side decisions are assumed exogenous in these studies.   
 
The emerging stream of structural models on the other hand focuses on, a single 
industry (intra-industry) with the objective of exploring how differences among 
firms in the same industry lead to differences in firm performance. By imposing an 
economic model grounded in economic theory, the observed data is used to recover 
the parameters of the economic primitives. Since the underlying economic model is 
invariant to shocks in the environment the agents operate in, this stream of research 
lends itself well to “what if” analysis, where outcomes to changes in the economic 
are simulated (Reiss and Wolak, 2002).  
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While both these streams of research have made enormous contributions to 
understanding industrial organization and compliment each other, they share one 
very significant limitation as explained below. 
 
Across the two streams, accumulated capacity (Saloner, 1987; Ghemawat, 1984), 
learning-by-doing/experience (Spence, 1981), first-mover advantage (Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1994) result in asymmetric differences in industry/firm profits. 
These studies find that across a majority of industries, production experience and 
cumulative production causes reduction in per-unit costs (Dutton and Thomas, 
1984). This is often referred to in the literature as “learning-by-doing” or 
“experience” effect.  Hence “learning by doing” can be to be a source of increasing 
returns and consequent first-mover advantages (Spence, 1981; Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1983).  
 
While these studies are very helpful in shedding light on the moderating role of 
accumulated capacity and experience/learning-by-doing on firm profits, they do not 
model the process that led to differences in capacity accumulation, learning-by-
doing and first-mover-advantage across firms/industries in the first place40.  
 
Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) introduce a dynamic equilibrium model that 
endogenizes and simulates the evolution of capacity accumulation but not cost 
efficiencies due to learning-by-doing. Benkard (2004) tries to understand the role of 
learning-by-doing on costs and thereby on the long-run entry-exit decisions of firms 
in the wide-bodied aircrafts market without studying capacity accumulation. 
                                                 
40 Two exceptions are the Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Benkard (2004) studies. 
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Like the Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Benkard (2004) studies, the current 
paper contributes to the literature by building a long-run equilibrium model where 
firms accumulate capacity and experience in a market, via endogenous entry, stay 
and exit decisions.  By doing so we model the process that led to differences in 
capacity accumulation, learning-by-doing and first-mover-advantage a limitation of 
the extant literature. While there might be other contributing factors to differences 
among firms, like Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Benkard (2004) studies, this 
study  limits the analysis to differences generated by the process of market entry, 
stay and exit decisions alone. 
 
In our model, entry results in capacity accumulation, while staying leads to 
learning-by-doing advantages either through better understanding of demand or 
better management of costs. Unlike Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Benkard 
(2004) studies, we jointly model both the process of capacity accumulation and 
learning-by-doing advantages, a limitation of these two studies.  
 
The proposed model allows one to probe the sources of the relationship between 
experience and marginal cost by analyzing the process of cost reduction in the 
lodging industry.  Our empirical model allows us to explore how costs vary across 
brands/firms and over time as a result of experience. Since we model the process of 
accumulation of capacity in a market by brand, we can assess if geographic 
agglomeration/clustering by a brand results in softening competition with other 
properties of same brand and deters future entry of its competitors (properties 
belonging to other brands).  
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Our proposed model accommodates strategic firm behavior. This is achieved 
through the optimality conditions, which in our case do not bound lodging 
properties to stay out of the market if current period profits are non-positive, a 
limitation of traditional static models. Thus our model allows firms to enter early 
either to reap benefits a) from “learning-by-doing” cost efficiency or b) from 
geographic agglomeration or to c) deter future entry. The model has a number of 
distinctive implications regarding market concentration, capacity accumulation and 
learning that are empirically tested.  
 
We exploit a rich new data set to analyze the role “learning-by-doing” and capital 
accumulation on the evolution of market structure of the lodging industry. Our 
analysis, finds strong empirical support for “learning-by-doing” cost efficiency. 
Cumulative experience of a lodging property (within a geographic market) reduces 
marginal cost but does so at a decreasing rate. We find that managers of lodging 
properties with “learning” cost advantage exploit their advantage to deter future 
entry of competitors. Counter to previous findings we find that “capacity 
accumulation” does not deter future entry of properties of the same brand and hurts 
long-run profits.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literatures on entry/exit 
and competitive dynamics. Section 3 describes the -- lodging industry -- the focal 
industry for our empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces the data used to calibrate 
the proposed model. Section 5 details our empirical model. Sections 6 and 7 provide 
details on the estimation procedure and results. Section 8 summarizes our findings 
and proposes directions for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
This study makes both methodological and substantive contributions to the 
literature on entry-exit and competitive dynamics. We review the two literatures in 
this section and provide explanation of the contributions made by this paper to both 
these literatures. 
 
2.1 Entry/Exit Literature Review 
Modeling the market entry/exit decisions is not new to marketing or economics. 
The Prescott and Visscher (1977), Mankiw and Whinston (1986) studies in 
economics, and Eliashberg and Chatterjee (1985) and Eliashberg and Jeuland 
(1986) studies in marketing propose analytical models for entry-exit decisions. The 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992) studies on the other hand 
pioneered estimation of equilibrium models of entry/exit studies. Bresnahan and 
Reiss (1990, 1991) infer competitive interactions between auto dealers from the 
measures of market size and industry concentration while Berry (1992) models firm 
entry decisions in the airline industry by modeling firm-specific sources of profit 
accounting for firm heterogeneity.  
 
Some studies examine other factors that affect entry-exit decisions in a competitive 
framework include – entry deterrence (Kadiyali, 1996; Ellison and Ellison, 2000), 
spatial entry models (Mazzeo 2002; Seim 2003), free entry and social efficiency 
(Berry and Waldfogel, 1999), entry of generic drugs (Scott Morton, 1999) etc. In 
markets with large setup costs and irreversible investment, factors like demand and 
cost uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), incomplete and/or asymmetric 
information (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990), early mover advantage (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1994), learning-by-doing cost efficiencies etc., affect long-run entry-
exit decisions (Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Sutton, 1991).  
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In all the studies mentioned above, the focal industries (airlines, pharmaceuticals, 
photo film, technology markets etc.) firms need to incur substantial costs to enter. 
Before firms incur these expenses they and their supporting financial institutions 
assess the long-term survival and financial viability of such investments be it 
purchasing more planes, setting up a new plant to manufacturer new photo-film or 
new drug. However despite these long-run considerations, the forementioned 
empirical studies either use static or two-period modeling framework to model firm 
entry/exit decisions. These modeling approaches ignore dynamic considerations 
beyond current/two periods.  
 
While the static/two period approach41 offers the convenience of tractability, it 
suffers from the drawback that the final period behaves like a static (one-period) 
model. However firms expecting continued dynamic behavior in the future may 
behave very differently than firms anticipating static conditions in future periods as 
is the case with two-period models.   
 
The contributions of this study to the entry/exit literature are as follows. First, we 
relax the limitations of static/two period models and examine long-run dynamic 
considerations that affect firm’s decisions to enter, continue or exit a geographic 
market. Second, making the assumption of forward-looking firms, the proposed 
model endogenizes long-run competitive entry, stay and exit decisions. Third, these 
decisions are outcomes of a dynamic game of incomplete information. Incomplete 
information stems from private shocks to firm costs (cost of entry, per-period 
maintenance cost and exit cost). The infinite-horizon nature of the model avoids the 
                                                 
41 Exceptions include Ericson and Pakes (1995), Pakes and McGuire (1994, 2001), Gowrisankaran 
and Town (1997), Benkard (2004) and Dube’ et al. (2003). 
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final period static problem of the two period models as stated above. Much like the 
Hopenhayn (1992) and Pakes and Ericsson (1998) studies we study firm dynamics 
assuming firm and market specific sources of uncertainty.  
 
Four, we account for factors like firm heterogeneity, excess capacity, learning by 
doing etc. that have been shown to affect firm decisions. These factors can also be 
affected by firm decisions. The feedback nature of these affects are appropriately 
captured in the proposed model as a first order Markov process where the evolution 
of future states is affected by past period market conditions and firm decisions, and 
influence firm decisions in future states. While some of the factors captured in our 
model have been studied separately or in part, to the best of our knowledge this 
study is the first to present a unified econometric framework -- jointly modeling the 
interdependencies between these factors and firm decisions. 
 
2.2 Competitive Dynamics – Literature Review 
 
Understanding and responding to industry dynamics is an important element of 
competitive marketing strategy and is not new to marketing. Dolan and Jeuland 
(1981), , Rao and Bass (1985) and Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) study pricing 
dynamics while Kadiyali et al. (1999) and Dube’ et al. (2003) study price and 
advertising dynamics in an oligopoly setting. In economics much of the literature 
has focused on factors like price (Bain, 1956; Kamien and Schwartz, 1971), 
experience/reputation (Smiley and David, 1983; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), 
capacity (Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980), learning by doing etc. that affect entry/exit 
decisions. Seminal papers like Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), Berry (1992) and 
more recently studies like Davis (2002), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2003), Tamer 
  
 109
(2003), Hitsch (2003) and Benkard (2004) propose empirical frameworks to capture 
some of the effects listed above.  
 
However as stated earlier in this section, with the exception of very few studies, 
most of the empirical work in economics and marketing examining entry/exit 
decisions ignore long-run dynamics. Two well-documented econometric issues may 
have limited the scope of application of more realistic long-run dynamic 
equilibrium models and its application to study firm entry/exit decisions. First, the 
curse of dimensionality where the costs of  equilibrium computation increases 
exponentially with the number of firms. Second, the indeterminacy problem 
associated with the existence of multiple equilibria (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 
2002b).  
 
Recent developments in econometric methods have resulted in introducing novel 
approaches to estimate structural parameters of empirical dynamic multi-agent 
games, while reducing the forementioned computation and multiple equilibria 
problems. Drawing on Rust (1997), Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and 
Ericson (1998),  Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002a,2002b) and Benkard (2004) 
propose new estimators to identify structural parameters of multi-agent long-run 
dynamic games. Dube et al. (2003) and Hitsch (2003) build on techniques proposed 
in the above studies to model advertising dynamics and firm learning under demand 
uncertainty.  
 
This essay is similar in spirit to the long-run dynamic empirical studies mentioned 
above in that it too relies on numerical dynamic programming computational 
techniques to model equilibrium outcomes, however differs both in methodological 
and substantive focus. Methodologically, we build on the nested pseudo likelihood 
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algorithm in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002b). While the Aguirregabiria and Mira 
(2002b) study is a single agent dynamic equilibrium model, this study proposes a 
similar nested pseudo likelihood algorithm for an oligopoly market. Rather than 
looking at continuous dynamic controls like price or advertising e.g. Dube et al. 
(2003) and Chan et al. (2003), we estimate a long-run discrete control dynamic 
game of entry, exit and stay decisions. 
 
The proposed model set in an equilibrium framework, allows for a better 
interpretation of the structural parameters (Reiss and Wolak, 2002; Kadiyali et al., 
1999) than reduced form single/two-period models. The model and estimation 
technique proposed in this essay, add to the growing set of tools in the analysis of 
empirical dynamic games. The framework can be used to study other important 
marketing problems like dynamic pricing, sequential release of new products, 
dynamic aspects of product positioning, product line design, location choice of 
retail outlets etc.  
 
To summarize, drawing on work in empirical industrial organization we present a 
Markov perfect equilibrium model to capture the long-run competitive dynamics in 
firm decisions.  We employ a two-step estimation algorithm to estimate the 
parameters of our long-run dynamic game. We account for observed and 
unobserved firm heterogeneity thereby guaranteeing existence of a pure strategy 
Markov perfect equilibria (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2003) while our 
estimation procedure ensures uniqueness Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002a, 2002b).  
Our model and findings provide guidance to managers on the effect of the ‘option 
value’ of delaying/expediting entry and exit decisions on both long-run cost and 
revenues. Third, unlike previous reduced form studies on the lodging industry like 
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Conlin and Kadiyali (2000), we structurally model the role of excess capacity and 
market uncertainty on entry deterrence42. 
 
We describe the lodging industry, data, our econometric model and estimator in 
sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The results of the analysis are presented in 
section 7. Conclusions and directions for future research are presented in Section 8. 
 
3. The Lodging Market 
The lodging industry revenue is a significant portion of consumer retail sales. The 
2004 Standard and Poor’s (henceforth S&P) Lodging and Gaming Industry survey 
projects annual revenues at about $100 billion  from room night sales alone. After 
accounting for costs of capital, service costs and costs of operation this amounts to 
about $16 billion dollars in profit. The S&P report states that by mid 2004, national 
level room-night sales amounted to 2.8 million rooms across 55,000 properties. 
Adjusting for size of properties this means that the nation wide demand is 
approximately one hotel room night for every 65 US residents. Unlike traditional 
consumer packaged goods, demand for hotel rooms comes from both domestic 
travelers (US residents who reside outside the geographic market in which the hotel 
is located) and international travelers43.  
While offering “refuge for rest and privacy” via rooms for rent, is viewed as being 
the primary purpose of the lodging industry, increasing competition has forced 
                                                 
42 We do not however endogenize capacity decisions.  
43 The number of international visitors to the United States declined 4%, to 40.4 million, in 2003, 
following a 7% drop, to 41.9 million, in 2002. 30% of international arrivals came from Canada and 
about 24% from Mexico. (Source - US Department of Commerce’s Office of Travel and Tourism 
Industries) 
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property managers to differentiate themselves from their competitors by offering 
features and services like spas, conference centers, pools, gyms and varying degrees 
of in-room service and amenities44.  
So as to operate and differentiate themselves from their competitors, lodging firms 
incur significant and irreversible setup costs. Industry experts project these costs as 
being in the range of a few million dollars per property, with annual nationwide 
expenditure on new construction being approximately $10.5 billion for year 200445. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of US lodging properties across parent 
brands and over time. In 2003 alone, 598 new hotels, with 71,691 rooms were 
opened, a net supply addition of 1.3% (after accounting for closings) over supply in 
2002. An estimated 62,984 rooms i.e. a 1.2% rise in net supply, are expected to 
debut in 200446. 
These numbers and Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggest significant cross-sectional and inter-
temporal variance in entry, exit and stay decisions among brands. Such investments 
are usually backed by large lending/commercial banking firms. So firm entry/exit 
decisions as well consumer demand can also be affected by macro-economic 
variables. An interesting question to ask is if firms engage in strategic behavior to 
deter future entry, even after we control for these macro-economic factors? If so 
does early entry and capacity accumulation provide costs and profit advantages 
thereby acting as credible threats for future entry? These are some of the questions 
we attempt to address in this paper. Next we explain the data used for our empirical 
analysis. 
                                                 
44 Source – Standard and Poor, Industry Report – Lodging & Gaming, August 5, 2004 by Tom 
Graves, CFA  
Casino & Hotel Analyst  
45 Source - US Department of Commerce. 
46 Source - Lodging Econometrics, a research division of National Hotel Realty. 
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4. Data 
For our empirical analysis we assemble a unique database containing information 
on the lodging properties in several metropolitan markets in Texas. The Texas State 
Comptroller requires every lodging property to report taxable and non-taxable 
revenues on a quarterly basis. Source Strategies Incorporated (SSI), an independent 
marketing research firm located in San Antonio, aggregates and augments this 
(public) information in their annual reports titled Texas Hotel Performance 
Factbook. The data contain information on all lodging properties (i.e., hotels, 
motels, bed-and-breakfasts) in Texas with annual revenues over 13,000 dollars from 
1991 through 2003. 
 
Hotel brands are categorized into sectors (Full-Service, Limited-Service or 
Extended Stay) and segments (Deluxe, Luxury, Upscale, and Midscale with Food 
and Beverage, Midscale without Food and Beverage, Economy, Budget, Upper-tier 
Extended Stay and Lower-tier Extended Stay). For the empirical analysis we use 
data from twelve large geographic markets in Texas. A market is defined as a 
city-month combination, which results in 12(metros)*13 (years)*12 (months) = 
1872 markets.   
 
Since computational load in long-run dynamic equilibrium models increase 
exponentially with number of firms, we choose to limit the empirical analysis to a 
single service sector namely -- Midscale 47. In order to account for sufficient 
differentiation we selected properties belonging to five large market share brands 
across different sub-tiers in the Midscale sector. The final sample consists of 1113 
unique properties across all markets. Out of these 507 properties entered prior to the 
                                                 
47 This sector exhibits maximum number of entries and exit relative to Full service and Extended 
stay sector.  
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start of our data, 606 entered within the time period of our data. 1027 properties are 
still in operation, of which 565 entered in our data, leaving  41 properties that 
entered and exited in our data.  We conduct the analysis for the Midscale segment 
while accounting for market specific variables that capture information on market 
evolution across the two other segments. 
 
Table 3.3 contains descriptive statistics for the final estimation sample. Note the 
significant variation in the number of active properties, implying large number of 
entries and exits.  Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide a clearer illustration of these 
activities. Figure 3.1 is a graphic showing the number of entries and exits across all 
markets. However we must also ensure that there is variation within each market. 
Figure 3.2 provides metro specific entry and exit time series for two such markets48. 
The graphed time-series shows significant variation within each metro. There is 
also no systematic pattern in entry-exit decisions across markets, therefore for the 
purpose of the empirical analysis we view these as independent markets i.e. non-
competing markets. Combining Figures 3.1 and 3.2, our data demonstrate 
significant entry/exit dynamics.  
 
Apart from entry-exit information, the data contain aggregate monthly information 
at the individual property level like brand affiliation, capacity, total rooms nights 
sold, average-daily-rate (ADR) prices/room-night etc.  ADR49 is estimated from 
surveys conducted by SSI, financial reports and information from appraisers, chain 
and AAA directories, and information provided by Smith Travel Resource.  
 
 
                                                 
48 Similar variance is also observed in the other ten geographic markets. 
49 The ADR is the pre-sales tax price. 
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TABLE 3.1 – Distribution Of Properties And Rooms Across Brands 
 
 
Source – Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys, Lodging and Gaming, August 2004. 
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 TABLE 3.2 – Distribution of Supply, Demand, Occupancy Rates and Revenues  
                         Over  Time 
 
               
     Source – Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys, Lodging and Gaming, August 2004 
4. Econometric Model  
This section formulates a stochastic long-run equilibrium model  for the lodging 
industry where property managers simultaneously choose an action from a finite set 
of alternatives (do not enter, enter, stay, exit)50. The framework generates discrete 
controls i.e. endogenous do not enter, entry, continue and exit decisions from a 
combination of deterministic and stochastic observable factors like demand, excess 
capacity, price, brand affiliation, experience and private investment shocks. The 
private shocks in each period are drawn from a known distribution function (Logit). 
Firms make long-run forward looking decisions taking into account the effect -- a) 
its own past and future entry, stay and exit decisions b) current, past and anticipated 
                                                 
50 We assume that each property is independently managed 
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decisions of its competitors and c) market uncertainty -- on current and future 
profits.  
 
Before describing the elements of the model lets list out the notations used 
t     =  time, takes on discrete values. t ∈ T = {1, 2…..∞} 
c    =  city  
j     =  lodging property. j ∈ Jc where Jc = {1, 2, ……Nc} is the set of 
properties in  
           the market. The set Nc is assumed to be finite 
            sjt    =  (Xjt, εjt) is the pairwise vector of observable and unobservable state  
variables for property j at time t  
           Xjt    =   vector of variables that are common knowledge to all properties  
Xt    =  vector of Xjt  
dt   =   vector of firm actions 
            St    =  market state vector = (s1t , s2t , ….. sNct)  
          Sj-,t   =  (s1t , s2t ,  …, sj-1t, sj+1t, .. sNct) is the state vector for the market 
excluding  
property j 
εjt     =  is a K dimension vector of εjkt     (one for each decision k), captures 
the real  
valued private shock to property j’s profit function. εjt  ∈ Rk   Each εjkt 
is i.i.d. with Type I extreme value distribution with mean 0 and 
variance σ51      
εt   = is a (K * Nc)*1 vector of  private knowledge of the firms in the market     
                                                 
51 The i.i.d assumption allows us to use the Markov decision framework. Interested readers can refer 
to Rust (1987) for more details. 
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We define a market as a city-month pair52.  There are Nc properties operating 
(making entry, exit or stay decisions) in city c at time t. If  j indexes a property then 
j ∈ Jc = {1, 2, ..., Nc}. In each market all firms, even those that are non operational 
at time t, simultaneously  decide if they want to stay  out, enter, stay or exit the 
market. So that the model is well behaved we assume that per period profits are 
bounded from above for all possible decisions D where the set D is finite53. 
Therefore, a firm’s set of choice alternatives is D = {0, 1, 2, 3}. We represent the 
decision of firm j at period t by the variable djt ∈ D such that  
 
0 if  j does not enter at time t 
                                              1    if  j enters at time t  
             djt ∈ D =                   2    if  j continues to stay at time t 
                                  3     if j exits the market at time t 
 
Variables in Xt include -- number of properties of the same brand that operate in the 
market, property capacity, market level excess capacity, average maturity of market 
(average number of months that incumbent firms have been operating in the 
market), quality, excess capacity for properties of similar quality etc. The market 
maturity measure, proxies for early mover accumulated stock. If there is any 
advantage to early entry then we would expect the parameter associated with this 
measure to be negative and significant. In order to capture learning-by-doing 
effects, like Benkard (2004) we allow the per-period costs to be a function of time 
                                                 
52 While the data contain information on zip codes and MSA associations for each property 
sparseness of the data and to avoid ad-hoc restriction of the competitive set, we chose city-month 
pair to be our market for the empirical analysis. The limitation of this approach is that all properties 
within a city however far apart they might be are viewed as being competitors. 
53 This implies that firm profits reduce as number of competitors increase in its market. 
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since entry54. Unobservable drivers like managerial ability, location and franchising 
etc are captured by private shock εjt. 
 
Property j’s current period profit depends on Xt, its own private information εjt, and 
on the vector of decisions djt ≡ (d0t, d1t, d2t, d3t).  Let vector Πj(dt, xt, εjt) be firm j’s 
current period profit function where evolution of (xt, εt) follows a controlled 
Markov process with transition probability p(xt+1,εt+1 | dt,xt,εt). It is worth pointing 
out that while εjt  is private knowledge its transition probability is common 
knowledge. 
 
Each property manager maximizes his/her long-run expected discounted profits 
given by  
                                  E[ Γ∑∞
=tm
m−t Πj(dm, xm, εjm) | xt, εit) ]                                       (1) 
where Γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. As in Rust (1997) assuming additive 
separability allows us to separate out the effect of private and public information on 
per period profits.  This implies   
                                      Πj(dm, xm,εjm) = Πj(dm, xm) + εjt(djt)                                   (2) 
Conditional independence allows us to independently model transition probability 
p(.|.) i.e. the model that captures the evolution of the state space is independent for 
private and public information55. In other words given firms’ decisions in period t 
and the independently distributed private information across firms implies 
                         p(xt+1,εt+1 | dt,xt,εt) = pε(εt+1) f (xt+1 | dt, xt)                                (3) 
                                              pε(εt) = ∏ g
=
Nc
j 1
j(εjt) 
                                                 
54 Our specification captures one of the many elements of learning-by-doing i.e. cost efficiencies. 
55 This assumption implies that the private information variables do not affect the transition of 
common knowledge variables and private information variables are independently and identically 
distributed over time. 
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where gj(.) is a continuous density function and f (.|.) is the p.d.f. of transition 
probability of the observable/common knowledge state variables. Like 
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002b) we assume that the common knowledge variables 
are discrete with finite support. 
If the property does not enter the market it earns zero profit in the current time 
period. Entry in current period results in no revenue that period, but requires a 
single period sunk cost of entry that is linear quadratic in the capacity of the 
property56 i.e  
Πjt(dj1t, x1t, ε1jt ) = + ε221 jtjt CapCap γγ + jt(d1jt)                    (4) 
Decision to stay in the market post entry results in a per period profit that is a 
function of current period demand ( ), price ( ), own excess capacity 
( ), market level excess capacity ( ), number of properties a) in the 
market  and b) of the same quality as property j ( ) c) of the same brand as j  
( ), quality (Q
jtD jtADR
jtECap tMECap
tN jqtN
jbt
N J). The market, within quality tier and within brand variables 
capture the strategic interactions. In order to capture the effects of learning-by-
doing we model the per period costs post entry as a function of time since entry 
(TSEjt) and current capacity. More specifically conditional on all other firms playing 
their optimal strategies                       
   Πjt(d2jt,x2t,ε2jt) = 
2
1312
2
1110
2
98
2
76
543210
)**(**
)*(*
)**(**
)*(*
 
tjjttjjt
jtjtjtjt
tjjttjjt
jtjtjtjt
qtbttjtjtb
MCapQTSEMCapQTSE
CapTSECapTSE
MECapQTSEMECapQTSE
ECapTSEECapTSE
NNNDADR
jjj
ββ
ββ
ββ
ββ
ββββββ
+−
+−
+−
+−
+++++
 +εjt(d2jt)        
                                                                                                                                  (5) 
                                                 
56 We assume that entry costs are completely incurred in the period prior to actual entry in the data. 
While we do not model this ourselves, another specification for entry costs could account for market 
density since its quite conceivable that scarcity of land can lead to higher entry costs for late 
entrants. 
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If an incumbent property j decides to exit then it obtains a scrap value for the 
property that is a function of the brand, quality, time since entry and existing 
capacity.    
 
Πjt(d3jt,x3t,ε3jt)=  +ε2210 )***(*** jtbjjtjtbjjt CapIQTSECapIQTSE jj µµµ ++ jt(d3jt)   
                                                                                                                                  (6) 
The vector of structural parameters of the model is [ ]µβα ,,=Θ .  
A Markov structure for the game being played between the lodging properties 
implies that when a firm is presented with the same state vector at different time 
periods and   it will take the same decision in both time periods.  Hence we 
can conveniently drop the time subscript. 
1jt
s
2jt
s
 
Let σ ={σj(x, εj)} be a set of strategy functions or decision rules, then associated 
with a set of strategy functions σ we can define a set of conditional choice 
probabilities  i.e. the expected behavior of the firm j as viewed by its 
competitors in its market when the firm j follows σ
)|( XdP jj
σ
j(x, εj).  The semi-conditional 
profit functions (Harsanyi, 1995)  , the expected payoff for firm j if it 
plays strategy d
)|( Xd jj
σΠ
j and its competitors play strategy dj- in σ is given by 
 
                                                   (8) ),,()|()|( tjjj
d j
jjtjj XddXdPXd
j
−
−
Π⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=Π ∑ ∏
−
σσ
where  is the conditional payoff. ),,( Xdd jjj −Π
 
The Bellman equation principle governed value function for firm j if firm j and its 
competitors behave optimally in the current and in all future periods is given by  
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[ ]
[ ] ),|()(),(
)(),()|( max
jtttj
t
jtjtjtjtjt
jtjttjtjt
Dd
tjtjt
dXXfdgXd
dXdXd
j
+
+
+++++
∈
∑ ∫ΞΓ+
+Π=Ξ
σσ
σσ
εε
ε
                (9) 
Where  is the transition probability of X conditional on firm j 
choosing  and the other firms behaving according to σ. The model that captures 
the evolution of the common knowledge state space is given by 
),|( jtttj dXXf +
σ
jtd
 
           (10) ),|()|()|(),|( ,
,
ttjjtt
d j
jjtjjjtttj XddXfXdPXddXXf
tj
−+
−
+ ∑ ∏
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=Π= σσσ
Conditional independence and independent private values allows us to integrate 
over the distribution of the private values to generate the integrated Bellman 
equation given by 
 
     (11) )(),|()()(),()( max jtj
X
jtttjtjjtjttjtjt
Dd
tj dgdXXfXdXdX
tj
εε σσσσ ∫ ∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ΞΓ++Π=Ξ
+
++
∈
Note that equation 11, is a contraction mapping in the space of value functions.  
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002b) prove that for a contraction mapping of the form 
in (11) there is a unique function that solves the above for a given )( tj X
σΞ σ .  
 
5. The Equilibrium Concept and Estimation  
Our long-run equilibrium specification does away with the limitations of previous 
two period/static models as explained in the previous sections. However the 
computation requirements for such equilibria can be quite prohibitive (Benkard, 
2004) since the tests for optimality require computing equilibria over all possible 
actions for each time period for all possible states and for all firms.  Rather than an 
approach that requires a repeated computation of equilibria, we use a two-step 
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estimator like that of Hotz and Miller (1993) for a single agent case and Benkard 
(2004) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002a, 2002b) for multi-agent dynamic 
equilibria.  
 
In the first step, we estimate the parameters of the model that govern  the transition 
probabilities of the observed (public) and unobserved (private) state variables via a 
nonparametric regression of the observed (in the data) decisions (entry, exit, stay 
and investments/costs) on the explanatory variables of the first order Markov 
process in equation 10. An assumption that facilitates recovery of the structural 
parameters of decision makers’ beliefs at each point in time is that all agents 
(property managers) have correct common beliefs about the factors of the 
environment and respond to the best response of other agents.  
 
The second step involves estimating the remaining structural parameters by 
matching the observed decisions (in the data) with the appropriate optimality 
conditions. This requires the observed decision at each state for each property to be 
weakly preferred to all feasible alternative decisions resulting in a system of 
equations for each property for each time period. The indifferent alternative is not 
observed but is inferred from the observed choices. Identification is therefore 
reduced to the existence of a unique solution to the equation system.  
  
Before we get to the estimation algorithm lets us characterize the equilibrium 
concept for the model described in the previous section. Given the Markov perfect 
equilibrium concept, each firm chooses an equilibrium strategy such that 
it is the best response to its competitor’s optimal strategy. Hence  
),(* jj X εσ
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tj X
jtttjtjjtjttjtjt
Dd
jttj dXXfXdXdArgX ),|()()(),(max),(
* σσσ εεσ       
                                                                                                                                (12) 
Note that the best response is a function of the choice probabilities.  Therefore the 
Markov perfect equilibria can be expressed as a contraction mapping in the 
probability space of firm strategies. This feature offers computational convenience 
and makes the equilibrium probabilities (not equilibrium itself) a fixed-point 
contraction mapping. Hence reformulating our contraction mapping as a mapping in 
the probability space and rewriting the integrated Bellman equation in terms of 
functions of *P  a vector equilibrium probabilities for all firms in a market yields 
 
jjj
X
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        (13) 
Note, constructing the mapping in the probability space allows us to take the future 
decisions as given thereby significantly reducing computational complexity since 
we don’t have to calculate the value functions for all future states as is done in Rust 
(1997). Assuming that is i.i.d Type 1 Gumbel yields the multinomial Logit 
expression for . 
(.)g
)(•Ψ
 
6. Estimation and Results 
To estimate the structural parameters of our model we use a nested pseudo 
likelihood (NPL) estimator. The NPL method is a recursive extension of the two-
step pseudo likelihood estimator (PML) that maximizes the number of evaluations 
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of  for different probability vectors P. The pseudo-likelihood 
function is given by  
);|( ttjtj PXdΨ
(∑∑∑
= = =
ΘΨ=Θ
C
c
T
t
Nc
j
ctjctj PXdC
PPMLE
1 1 1
),;|(ln1),( )                       (14) 
The estimation procedure starts with P0 , an initial guess of the vector of players’ 
choice probabilities. Given P0, NPL generates a sequence of estimators such that   
 
),(
)),(max(arg
1
1
−
−
ΘΨ=
Θ=Θ
kkk
kk
PP
PPMLE
                                       (15) 
The NPL is a fixed point in the limit of this sequence57. NPL is more efficient than 
PML and therefore more efficient than the two-step PML.  
 
The empirical analysis involves estimation of five different models including the 
proposed model. In order to compare the appropriateness of our long-run dynamic  
model, we start by estimating a static model. Model 1 is a static model where we 
force the discount factor to be zero. This results in firms making decisions that 
maximize only current period profits and not the expected discounted current period 
profits. Model 2, is a MPNE based dynamic model with the added constraint that 
firms are homogenous i.e. without observed heterogeneity that stem from brand 
fixed effects and quality dummy. Model 3, relaxes the homogeneity assumption and 
allows observed heterogeneity.  Note that while we account for observed 
heterogeneity the model still assumes symmetric Markov perfect equilibria58.  
Model 4, captures the role of learning-by-doing effects on firm costs. Model 5 is the 
                                                 
57 Please refer to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) for detailed explanation of how in the limit NPL 
satisfies Brower’s theorem and guarantees the existence of at least one fixed point. 
58 To account for asymmetric equilibria we would have to allow for mixed strategies which adds 
more complexity to the modeling framework. Furthermore existence conditions for such equilibria 
are not clear and beyond the scope of this study. 
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full model proposed in previous section accounts for firm heterogeneity, learning-
by-doing effects and role of excess capacity on firm decisions. Tables 3.4 a) and 3.4 
b) illustrate the explanatory variables included in each of the models. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis is shown in Tables 3.5 a) and 3.5 b) 
respectively. Focusing on common parameter estimates of Model 1 and others 
models, we observe that by and large Model 1 over-estimates the factors that drive 
firm decisions. As shown in Table 3.6 based on BIC model selection criteria the 
Model 1 has worst statistical fit when compared to it dynamic counterparts.  
Within-sample predictions using a hit rate statistic also demonstrate the significant 
improvement in predictions by accounting for long-run dynamic effects. 
 
The empirical findings of this essay therefore provide support for the 
appropriateness of a dynamic framework to study entry, stay and exit decisions in 
our data. Accounting for observed heterogeneity improves the fit of Model 2. 
Significant differences in the magnitude and signs of the brand fixed effects 
indicate a high degree of variation among firms. This could be in part because of 
our choice of brands for the empirical analysis where for the purpose of accounting 
for vertical and horizontal differentiation we choose large share brands across 
different sub-tiers of the Midscale sector.   
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b) Exits
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Figure 3.1 – Market Level Entry-Exit-Decisions 
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Figure 3.2 – City Specific Entry-Exit Decisions 
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TABLE 3.3 - Descriptive Statistics Of Estimation Sample 
 
 
Variable                   Mean                Std Dev             Min               Max        
          
              Capacity                102.93               44.44                  32.00            276.00      
 
              Price (ADR)                           35.38                31.08                    0                205.33 
        
              Number of active firms      199.64                53.09                128.00           259.00 
   
             Number of active firms  
             of same brand                          8.13                   4.72                  1.00              18.00   
 
             Number of active firms 
             of same quality                     114.67                 34.28                62.00            151.00  
     
             Excess Capacity (property)   23.11                 22.52                 8.60              95.53 
  
             Excess Capacity (market)     21.53                  21.31                 0                   75.89 
      
             Months since entry              119.06                182.64                 0               1734.00 
      
             Average months since entry  
             (market)                                  93.12                 33.59                 34.64           185.74 
      
             Average months since entry  
             (same quality)                         93.91                 39.56                 20.09           198.01 
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TABLE 3.4 (a) - Effects 
                                                                                 
Variables  
Structural 
Parameters 
Model 1 
Static 
model 
Model 2  
Without 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 3 
With 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 4 
Model 2 + 
Learning-
by-Doing 
Efficiency 
 
Model 5 
Model 3 + 
Excess 
Capacity 
 
Entry 
Variables 
Capacity    ( 1γ ) √ √ √ √ √ 
 Capacity2   ( 2γ ) √ √ √ √ √ 
Stay 
Variables 
Brand 1 (
10 b
β )  - √ √ √ 
 Brand 2 (
20 b
β )  - √ √ √ 
 Brand 3 (
30 b
β )  - √ √ √ 
 Brand 4 (
40 b
β )  - √ √ √ 
 Price ( 1β ) √ √ √ √ √ 
 Demand ( 2β ) √ √ √ √ √ 
 No. of Active 
Firms ( 3β ) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
 No. of Firms of 
same Brand 
( 4β ) 
- - √ √ √ 
 Number of Firms 
of same quality 
( 5β ) 
- - √ √ √ 
 Experience 
weighted excess 
capacity of 
property ( 6β ) 
- - - - √ 
 (Experience 
weighted excess 
capacity of 
property)2 ( 7β ) 
- - - - √ 
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TABLE 3.4 (b)  - Effects (continued) 
 
Variables  
Structural 
Parameters 
Model 
1 
Static 
model 
Model 2 
Without 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 3 
With 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 4 
Model 2 + 
Learning-
by-Doing 
Efficiency 
 
Model 5 
Model 3 + 
Excess 
Capacity 
 
 Experience and 
quality weighted 
excess capacity of 
market ( 8β ) 
- -   √ 
 (Experience 
weighted excess 
capacity of 
market)2  ( 9β ) 
- -   √ 
 (Experience 
weighted capacity 
of property)  
( 10β ) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
 (Experience 
weighted capacity 
of property)2  
( 11β ) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
 (Experience and 
quality weighted 
capacity of 
market)  12β  
- - √ √ √ 
 (Experience and 
quality weighted 
capacity of 
market)2  ( 13β ) 
- - √ √ .√ 
Exit 
Variables 
(Experience, 
quality and brand 
weighted capacity 
of property)  1µ  
√ √ √ √ √ 
 (Experience, 
quality and brand 
weighted capacity 
of property)2  
( 2µ ) 
√ √ √ √ . √ 
 Fixed effect 
( 0µ ) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
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TABLE 3.5 (a) - Estimation Results 
 
Variables  
Structural 
Parameters 
Model 1 
Static 
model 
Model 2 
Without 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 3 
With 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogene
ity 
Model 4 
Model 2 + 
Learning-
by-Doing 
Efficiency 
 
Model 5 
Model 3 
+ Excess 
Capacity 
 
Entry 
Variables 
Capacity    ( 1γ ) 5.09 -6.78 -5.19 -3.87 -2.04 
 Capacity2   ( 2γ ) -2.19 .027 1.34 2.65 1.77 
Stay 
Variables 
Brand 1 (
10 b
β )  - 9.32 11.59 12.38 
 Brand 2 (
20 b
β )  - 13.41 18.67 15.09 
 Brand 3 (
30 b
β )  - 2.54 4.23 11.52 
 Brand 4 (
40 b
β )  - 6.98 4.36 3.94 
 Price ( 1β ) 23.08 18.91 21.44 19.87 7.73 
 Demand ( 2β ) 28.94 19.34 18.39 16.95 13.78 
 No. of Active 
Firms ( 3β ) 
-5.77 -3.71 -2.88 -3.48 -3.09 
 No. of Firms of 
same Brand 
( 4β ) 
- - -1.11 -2.08 -2.85 
 Number of 
Firms of same 
quality ( 5β ) 
- - -4.55 -9.37 -8.60 
 Experience 
weighted excess 
capacity of 
property ( 6β ) 
- - - - 4.29 
 (Experience 
weighted excess 
capacity of 
property)2 ( 7β ) 
- - - - 1.36** 
 
** implies statistically not significant 
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TABLE 3.5 (b) - Estimation Results (continued) 
Variables  
Structural 
Parameters 
Model 1 
Static 
model 
Model 2 
Without 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 3 
With 
Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 4 
Model 2 + 
Learning-
by-Doing 
Efficiency 
 
Model 5 
Model 3 
+ Excess 
Capacity 
 
 Experience and 
quality weighted 
excess capacity 
of market ( 8β ) 
- -   1.01 
 (Experience 
weighted excess 
capacity of 
market)2  ( 9β ) 
- -   .633 
 (Experience 
weighted 
capacity of 
property)  ( 10β ) 
5.79 4.07 3.87 2.50 3.13 
 (Experience 
weighted 
capacity of 
property)2  
( 11β ) 
1.008** 1.20** 3.71** 3.54 2.001 
 (Experience and 
quality weighted 
capacity of 
market)  12β  
- - 2.60 1.87 2.903 
 (Experience and 
quality weighted 
capacity of 
market)2  ( 13β ) 
- - .409 .005** .0866** 
Exit 
Variables 
(Experience, 
quality and brand 
weighted 
capacity of 
property)  1µ  
17.40 16.41 11.38 13.21 9.97 
 (Experience, 
quality and brand 
weighted 
capacity of 
property)2  ( 2µ ) 
5.16 3.80** 2.04 .833 .234 
 Fixed effect 
( 0µ ) 
26.34 18.34 9.30 4.31 4.054 
 
** implies statistically not significant 
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Table 3.6 - Model Selection Criteria 
 
Model 
Selection 
Criteria 
Model 1 
Static 
model 
Model 2 
Without 
Observed Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 3 
With Observed 
Firm 
Heterogeneity 
Model 4 
Model 2 + 
Learning-by-
Doing 
Efficiency 
 
Model 5 
Model 3 + 
Excess 
Capacity 
 
BIC 
 
-36,996 -32,184 -28,691 -23,455 -21,743 
Hit Rate 
 
.374 .51 .57 .612 .673 
 
                                                                                                                  
Model 4, provides empirical support for learning-by-doing effects on firm decisions. 
The sign of the first order and second order cost variables shows significant cost 
efficiencies as a result of learning. The signs of these parameters suggest that with 
experience property managers become more efficient in containing operating costs of 
capital. Finally Model 5 i.e. our proposed model provides significant improvement 
over Model 1 and incremental improvements in fit over its predecessor models. As 
demonstrated in Conlin and Kadiyali (2000) we also find a significant role of excess 
capacity both at the market and within quality tier, on firm entry decisions. The 
negative sign suggests that market excess capacity can deter future entry. This effect 
is stronger within the same quality tier than at the market level59 providing evidence 
of greater competitive interactions between firms belonging to same quality tier than 
across different tiers. 
 
 
                                                 
59 Note that excess capacity in this paper is treated as being exogenous. Realizing that excess capacity 
deters future entry and operating costs of excess capacity will reduce over time, incumbent firms 
might act strategically and invest in excess capacity. While endogeinity in capacity choice is not 
account for in our model, it is a worthwhile area for future extension of this paper.  
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7. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
This paper presents empirical dynamic discrete game-theoretic model of entry, exit 
and stay for the lodging industry in Texas.  The proposed model presents a unified 
model of numerous factors that affect and are affected by competitive entry, stay and 
exit decisions. Unlike previous reduced form static/two period models in this essay a 
long-run equilibrium model is presented. Based on non-nested model selection 
criteria (BIC) our empirical results demonstrate that a long-run dynamic equilibrium 
model better describes the behavior of firms in our data than single period/static 
models60.  
 
Extensions to this essay could include a) multi-segment comparisons b) correction 
for price and/or capacity endogeneity c) accounting for strategic excess capacity 
decisions and d) accounting for possible correlations in the private shocks across the 
discrete decisions.  
 
To summarize, we make a case for the appropriateness of dynamic game-theoretic 
modeling frameworks to study discrete decisions for example entry/exit decisions in 
markets with large entry costs and irreversible investments. While entry, exit and 
stay decisions is the main focus of this essay, the modeling framework can be 
extended to account for price dynamics. Entry deterrence strategies like limit pricing 
(Masson and Shaanan, 1986) and excess capacity (Conlin and Kadiyali, 2000) can be 
better explained using such integrated dynamic models since these models account 
for anticipatory behavior not captured in static models.   
                                                 
60 The proposed model also outperforms a static model on prediction task i.e. hit rate criteria. Please 
contact the author for detailed information on the hit rate results and calculation procedure. 
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